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STUDENT NOTES

SELF-DETERMINATION, MINORITY RIGHTS,
AND CONSTITUTIONAL
ACCOMMODATION: THE EXAMPLE
OF THE CZECH AND SLOVAK
FEDERAL REPUBLIC
Claudia Saladin *
Perhaps the greatest threat to establishment of stable democracies

in Eastern Europe is ethnic tension.I Self-determination and the rights
of minorities are especially important issues for these countries because of their ethnically diverse populations. As the following discus-

sion will demonstrate, the issues of self-determination and minority
rights are closely related to one another and to the issue of democratic

legitimacy. Using the example of current constitutional reform and
debate in the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (CSFR), this Note
will describe the interrelationship of these issues. It will argue for the
necessity of recognizing the legitimate right of ethnically, linguistically, and culturally distinct communities to a certain measure of autonomy. At the same time, this right must be balanced against the
needs of nation states for cohesion in domestic affairs and for the development of a sense of national unity.
Part I will explore the concepts of self-determination and minority

rights in international law and their development over time. This is
particularly relevant to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe,
because these concepts saw their first full flowering in the period during and following the First World War, when those countries gained
• B.A., Oberlin College (1987); University of Michigan Law School, Class of 1992; University of Michigan Center for Russian and East European Studies, Masters Candidate 1993.
1. See, e.g., Celestine Bohlen, East Europe's Past Imperils 3 Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16,
1990, § 1, pt. I at 16; Celestine Bohlen, Ethnic Rivalries Revive in East Europe, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 12, 1990, at A 1; Burton Bollag, Havel Asserts Nation Faces Breakup, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11,
1990, at A4; Czechoslovakia, The Dangerof Delinquency, ECONOMIST, Mar. 16, 1991, at 44; Jan
Urban, Eastern Europe - Divided it Fails, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 21, 1990, at 23; see also AREND
LiJPHART, DEMOCRACY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES 1 (1977) ("Social homogeneity and political consensus are regarded as prerequisites for, or factors strongly conducive to, stable democracy. Conversely, the deep social divisions and political differences within plural societies are held
responsible for instability and breakdown in democracies."). Indeed, some would argue that
such social diversity "necessarily entails the maintenance of political order by domination and
force." Id. at 18.
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their independence from the European powers. 2 Part II will discuss
the evolution of the constitutional relationship between the Czechs
and the Slovaks from the constitution of the first Czechoslovak Republic to the current constitutional reforms of the CSFR. This analysis will show the emerging recognition of a limited right to a measure
of autonomy.
I.

SELF-DETERMINATION

The concepts embodied in the principle of self-determination have
been developing since at least the American and French revolutions.
They are intimately connected with the concept of popular sovereignty
proclaimed by the French Revolution: government based on the will
of the people. 3 But self-determination is not simply synonymous with
representative democracy. It also entails the notion of freedom from
alien rule,4 which focuses on the rights of States against other States.
These different perspectives on self-determination are often referred to
as internal self-determination and external self-determination. 5
This distinction is crucial because internal self-determination cuts
against traditional notions of State sovereignty. For this reason States
have been reluctant to recognize it. Since the Second World War, selfdetermination in international law has been concerned primarily with
the external aspect of self-determination, in the context of decolonization. Professor Antonio Cassese has argued that this focus was due to
the bifurcated nature of the international community in the period following the Second World War and the different political agendas of
East and West during that period. 6 In general, the West has viewed
the existence of a truly representative government as "the surest guarantee of genuine 'self-determination'" for all peoples. 7 External selfdetermination, or freedom from outside domination, was seen as peripheral. 8 The non-Western countries emphasized the concept of self2. See infra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Dov RONEN, THE QUEST FOR SELF-DETERMINATION 1-9 (1979); A. RiGO
SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973); UMOZURIKE
0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 6-11 (1972); Patrick

Thornberry, Self-Determination, Minorities, Human Rights: A Review of International Instruments, 38 INT'L & COMF. L.Q. 867, 869 (1989).
4. HURST HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-DETERMINATION 30 (1990);
UMOZURIKE, supra note 3, at 3; Thornberry, supra note 3, at 869.

5. See, e.g., MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE 37-42
(1982); Thornberry, supra note 3, at 869.
6. ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 134 (1986).
7. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 38; see also infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
8. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 38.
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determination as the right of sovereign States to nonintervention. 9 Ac-

cording to Cassese, a limited consensus resulted from this conflict. Internal self-determination was limited to the right to be free from a
racist regime and external self-determination was granted only to peoples under colonial domination.' 0 With the end of the Cold War,
representative democracy is reemerging as a crucial element of selfdetermination."I The following sections will discuss some of the aspects of the right to self-determination and their development over
time.

A.

Who Has the Right to Self-Determination?

The right to self-determination is generally held to belong to "peoples" and not to "minorities." Whether a group is considered a people
or a minority is significant in determining what rights can be attributed to the group under international law. Modern international law
recognizes three collective human rights of peoples:12 the right to
physical existence,' 3 the right to self-determination,' 4 and the right to
natural resources.' 5 Minorities have two collective human rights
under international law:' 6 the right to physical existence' 7 and the
right to preserve a separate identity.' 8 A crucial difference, then, between peoples and minorities is the right to self-determination. As set
forth in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, selfdetermination refers to full rights in the cultural, economic, and polit9. Declarationon the Inadmissibilityof Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the
Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, 20th Sess.,
Supp. No. 14, at 11, U.N.Doc. A/6014 (1966); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J.
INT'L L. 459, 466 (1971).
10. CASSESE, supra note 6, at 134; see HANNUM, supra note 4, at 49; see also infra notes 31,
93-94, and accompanying text.
11. See Rights of Self-Determination of Peoples in EstablishedStates: Southern Africa and the
Middle East (panel discussions), 85 PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. (forthcoming Dec. 1991).
12. Yoram Dinstein, Collective Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 102,
105-11 (1976).
13. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, opened for
signature Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) [hereinafter Genocide
Convention].
14. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, openedfor signature Dec. 16, 1966,
art. l(l), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights]; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, opened for
signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. l(l), 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].
15. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 1(2); Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 14, art. 1(2).
16. Dinstein, supra note 12, at 118.
17. Genocide Convention, supra note 13.
18. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 27; Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 14, arts. 13 & 15.
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ical spheres, with political control being the most essential aspect of
the right.' 9 Minority rights as set forth in the Covenant do not include
20
political control.
Despite the importance of the difference between the two groups
there is no official definition of either minority or people. Francesco
Capotorti, the special rapporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, defines minority
as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a
non-dominant position, whose members-being nationals of the Statepossess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from those
of the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly a sense of solidarity, directed
towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or
21
language.
This definition includes both objective criteria (groups with distinct
characteristics, numerical inferiority, nondominant position) and subjective criteria (a group perception of distinctiveness and a desire to
preserve that distinctiveness). Definitions of "peoples" given by scholars have similar criteria. Yoram Dinstein, for example, argues that
"peoplehood" is contingent on two separate elements: the objective
element of the existence of an ethnic group linked by a common his22
tory and the subjective element of the state of mind of the group.
Aureliu Critescu, also a special rapporteur of the Sub-commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, lays out
the following criteria as crucial in defining a people for the purpose of
affording them the right of self-determination:
(a) The term "people" denotes a social entity possessing a clear
identity and its own characteristics,
(b) It implies a relationship with a territory, even if the people in
question have been wrongfully expelled
from it and artificially
replaced by another population. 23
Thus the crucial element distinguishing a people from a minority is the
19. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 1(1) ("All peoples have the
right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.").
20. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 880; see Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note
14, art. 27.
21. FRANCESCO CAPOTORTI, STUDY ON THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS BELONGING TO ETHNIC,
RELIGIOUS, AND LINGUISTIC MINORITIES at 96, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/384/Rev.l, U.N.

Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (1979).
22. Dinstein, supra note 12, at 104.
23. AURELIU CRITESCU, THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION:

HISTORICAL AND CURRENT DEVELOPMENT ON THE BASIS OF UNITED NATIONS INSTRUMENTS at 41, U.N. Doc. E/
CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.l, U.N. Sales No. E.80.XIV.3 (1981). Critescu then cautions that "[a]
people should not be confused with ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities," without, however,
defining or distinguishing "minority." Id.

Michigan Journal of InternationalLaw

[Vol. 13:172

concept of territory, but scholars seem hard pressed to articulate further the difference between peoples and minorities.
Despite the different rights attributed to "minorities" and "peoples," international law provides neither a practical nor a legal means
of distinguishing between the two. While the Hungarians are obviously a people, possessing their own territory and nation state, and
sharing a common history, Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia are a
minority. Such a group, which represents a portion of a people separated from the territorial nation state of their larger group, is clearly, a
minority in some sense of the word. But when one considers ethnic
groups that do not possess a nation state of their own, defining the
difference between a minority and a people becomes more problematic.
Take the Kurds as an example: they are a distinct group possessing
distinct ethnic and linguistic characteristics as well as a subjective
group identity and a territorial base, yet within each nation state that
they occupy (Iraq, Turkey, the USSR, and Iran) they are treated as a
minority, although they appear to meet all the criteria of a people.
Unlike the Hungarians living in Czechoslovakia, they have no nation
state of their own to which they could emigrate or which is in a position to petition other States for their protection. The Slovaks are
problematic in a similar way, although, as a group, they have the comparative advantage over the Kurds of being within one State. They
possess a history and language separate from, although related to, that
of the Czechs. They also possess a distinct territorial base. They have
existed, briefly, as a nation state and have also been a distinct territorial and administrative unit within Czechoslovakia since 1968. In a
large part the difficulty in arriving at, or deriving from practice, meaningful definitions of these two categories, demonstrates the confusion
surrounding these concepts and the artificiality of the distinction between them. Instead, the concepts might be conceived of as points on
a continuum, or different manifestations of a single problem, rather
24
than as distinct categories.
Professor Ian Brownlie has asserted that "the issues of self-determination, the treatment of minorities and the status of indigenous
populations, are the same, and the segregation of topics is an impediment to fruitful work."'25 He goes on to argue that the recognition of
group rights, that is, minority rights, represents the practical and internal working of the concept of self-determination, 26 providing a link
24. Ian Brownie, The Rights of Peoples in Modern InternationalLaw, in THE RIGHTS OF
PEOPLES 1, 5-6 (James Crawford ed., 1988).
25. Id. at 16.
26. Id. at 6.
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between the concepts of self-determination and minority rights.
Brownlie contends that the core of the principle of self-determination
consists of the right of a community that has a distinct character to
27
have this character reflected in the institutions under which it lives.
The eclectic terminology used in discussing self-determination"nationalities," "peoples," and "minorities"-all involve the same
28
concept.
The problem inherent in the realization of both self-determination
and minority rights, and in developing accurate and consistent terminology with which to discuss the problem, is the impossibility of complete and universal application of the principle of self-determination, if
self-determination is to mean political independence, or "full" external
self-determination. 29 It is precisely the difficulty of giving full political
independence to all who ask for it that led many to accuse the peacemakers at Versailles of applying a double standard, meaning that only
some peoples gained full independence. 30 The problem of the double
standard has again manifested itself as new countries have gained independence from colonial rule. Until recently the content of the norm
of self-determination in international law was limited to the right to be
free from colonial or racist rule. As one author has put it, "the arrival
of independence entails 'the subjugation of new minorities to new majorities.' "31 Put another way, the majorities in newly independent
countries often oppressed the minorities, especially since the concept
of nonintervention protected these new majorities from international
scrutiny of their treatment of minorities. Michla Pomerance argues
that this outcome is no less a double standard than that reached at
Versailles, and that while the much maligned League system had
many faults it had certain virtues in terms of international guarantees
for the rights of groups which were not afforded full "external" selfdetermination.

32

B.

CulturalRights and Human Rights

Cultural rights of peoples-that is, the rights of groups to preserve
their own culture and identity-are implicit in the right of self-deter27. Id. at 5.
28. Id. at 5-6; see also Thornberry, supra note 3, at 868 ("Minorities appropriate the vocabulary of self-determination whether governments or scholars approve or not.").
29. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 6.

30. Id.
31. Id. at 37 (citation omitted).
32. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 40-41.
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mination 33 as they are in minority rights. To a certain extent cultural
rights have also been implicit in individual rights; so, for example,
freedom to express one's views, practice one's religion, and associate
with others are all rights necessary to the development and maintenance of a group culture. 34 Inherent in the concept of cultural rights
is the idea that groups as such have rights, although human rights
instruments have not really addressed group rights apart from selfdetermination. 35 A general assumption behind classical formulations
of standard human rights is that if individual rights are protected,
group rights will automatically be protected. 36 This assumption, however, does not address the claimed right of groups to take positive action to maintain their cultural and linguistic identity, nor does it
address the claims of groups based on the right to self-determination;
such claims involve a variety of political models, including independence, statehood, or some form of autonomy or associated
37
statehood.
Patrick Thornberry has argued that minority rights are really a
form of human right because any system of human rights must recognize that people exist not simply as individuals, but within their
cultural settings. 38 Both individual rights and rights addressed to protecting minorities are necessary for the perpetuation of minority cultures and the protection of the human rights of the individual
members of those cultures. 39 Others have expressed the relationship
between individual and group rights as follows: group rights are necessary to ensure the effective implementation of fundamental individual rights, because if minorities are not given rights specifically
designed to defend their culture they will be treated unequally and
unjustly. 4° Thus, minorities need special rights to defend their cultures in order to give meaning to other fundamental human rights,
such as equality. Without these "special rights" members of the mi33. Vernon Van Dyke, The Cultural Rights of Peoples, UNIVERSAL HUM. RTS., Apr.-June
1980, at 1.
34. HANNUM, supra note 4, at 109-10; Lyndel V. Prott, Cultural Rights as Peoples' Rights in
International Law, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 24, at 93, 94; see also Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, arts. 18-19 & 21.
35. Brownlie, supra note 24, at 2-3 (discussing articles 1 and 27 of the Covenant on Civil and

Political Rights).
36. Id.; see also infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
37. Brownlie, supra note 24, at 2-4.
38. Patrick Thornberry, Is There a Phoenix in the Ashes? - International Law and Minority
Rights, 15 TEX. INT'L L.J. 421, 445-46 (1980).
39. Id.
40. Gillian Triggs, The Rights of 'Peoples' and Individual Rights: Conflict or Harmony?, in
THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 24, at 141, 145. For a discussion of the League minority
protection system, see infra notes 51-58 and accompanying text.
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nority possess only the right to assimilation into the dominant
41
culture.

Although it would appear that group rights are necessary to protect individual rights, nevertheless a conflict is perceived between individual and group rights. 42 This clash has often been associated with

the ideological divisions of the Cold War. It is described as one between the Western liberal tradition stressing the importance of the individual, and the non-Western view stressing the importance of the
collectivity, economic rather than political rights, and equality over
43

liberty.
Yet it is not merely Cold War rhetoric that has created tension
between the two sets of rights. The conflicting principles relate to the
problems posed in plural societies." The focus on the individual
manifests itself at the domestic level in the concepts of equality and
nondiscriminatory treatment. The principle of "one person, one
vote," however, makes it highly probable that some people will be relegated to the status of permanent minorities, and so may serve discriminatory ends. 4 5 The focus on group rights manifests itself at the
international level by permitting particular groups to look after their
own interests in relative independence from other groups. Neither
principle can be carried to its logical extreme; the problem in plural

societies is how to combine these competing principles of individual
46
rights and group rights in a manner that protects both.

C.

The Development of Self-Determination

Self-determination and minority rights became prominent in international relations in the aftermath of World War I. President Wilson
believed that the concepts of self-determination and democracy were
41. Thornberry, supra note 38, at 440;

CAPOTORTI,

supra note 21, at 40-41.

42. See PAUL SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS § 26 (1983); Eugene Kamenka, Human Rights: Peoples Rights, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 24, at

127, 139; John P. Humphrey, The World Revolution and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
FEDERALISM, AND MINORITIES 147 (Allan Gotlieb ed., 1970).

43. See Humphrey, supra note 42, at 151-52; Triggs, supra note 40, at 142 (U.S. withdrawal
from UNESCO in part because of emphasis on collective rights);.
44. The following discussion is from Van Dyke, supra note 33, at 1, 7-8. Arend Lijphart has
defined plural societies as those divided by political divisions that closely follow social cleavages
which are particularly salient to that society. Such cleavages "may be of a religious, ideological,
linguistic, regional, cultural, racial or ethnic nature." LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 3-4.
45. See LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 145 ("The... meaning of democracy, that the will of the
majority must prevail, violates the primary rule [that citizens must have the opportunity to participate in decision-making] . . . because it excludes the minority from the decision-making
process ... ").
46. This is the question Van Dyke poses in his article. Van Dyke, supra note 33, at 8. The
competing principles could also be defined as majority rule and some form of proportional representation. See LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 145.
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intimately related. 47 He considered external freedom from alien sovereignty meaningless without a continuing process of self-government
internally. 48 Conversely, if a regime were democratic, then external
self-determination became peripheral. 49 To Wilson's mind the minority regime became necessary only in the absence of true self-government. 50 As he conceived it, the principle of self-determination had the
protection of minorities as a corollary. He originally proposed that an
article on minorities be inserted in the League of Nations Covenant
but, instead, minority rights were dealt with in territorial treaties guaranteed by the League. 51 In particular there were five special minority
5 2
treaties, including one with Czechoslovakia.
The purpose of the minorities rights guarantee, which was laid out
by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in Minority
Schools in Albania, was to put nationals belonging to minorities on an
equal footing with other nationals and to assure minorities the means
to preserve their traditions and national characteristics. 53 The League
guarantee had internal and external aspects. Internally the State was
required to regard the treaty provisions as fundamental law that invalidated any laws that conflicted with them. Externally the guarantee
applied only to the infringement of rights of persons belonging to racial, religious, or linguistic minorities. 54 The League guarantee meant
that the Council of the League could take action in the event of an
infraction of the treaty obligation. Members of the Council had a duty
to call attention to actual or threatened infractions. Minorities themselves were allowed to petition the League, but in practice the right
was exercised primarily by strong minorities, such as the Germans,
47. 54 CONG. REC. 1742 (Jan. 22, 1917) (Statement of President Wilson before the Senate)
("No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognize and accept the principle that
governments derive all their just power from the consent of the governed, and that no right
anywhere exists to hand peoples about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were property."); President Woodrow Wilson, Address before the League to Enforce Peace (May 27,
1916), reprinted in 53 CONG. REC. 8854 (May 29, 1916) ("We believe these fundamental things:
First, that every people has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.");
POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 3.
48. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 3.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also HANNUM, supra note 4, at 31 ("[T]he League of Nations scheme for minority
protections was in part designed to provide what might be termed cultural self-determination to
those groups whose demands for fuller political recognition were denied by the Great Powers.").
51. Thornberry, supra note 38, at 428-29; Mary Gardiner Jones, National Minorites: A Case
Study ofInternational Protection, 14 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 599, 604-05 (1949).
52. For a more detailed discussion of the League of Nations minority protection system, see
Thornberry, supra note 38, at 428-31; CAPOTORTI, supra note 21, at 17-18.
53. 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 17; see also HANNUM, supra note 4, at 31;
Thornberry, supra note 38, at 431-33.
54. Thomberry, supra note 38, at 433.
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rather than by weaker minorities, such as the Jews."5 Minorities were
strongest if there was a State in which they constituted the majority
and which acted to guarantee their rights in a bilateral treaty.5 6 Stateless minorities such as Jews and Gypsies were relatively weak because
they lacked such a champion.
The League system was a step forward in human rights law because it developed the notion of rights against the State. 7 In the end,
however, the system deteriorated because of State objections to the
limitation placed on their sovereignty by the minorities treaties and
the instability generated by fractious minorities within their territory;
minorities themselves wanted liberalization of the petition procedure
58
and greater autonomy and assurances against assimilation.
After the Second World War there was a general disenchantment
with the League minorities program. This was partly due to the perceived double standard in the League system. Only the rights of minorities were raised to the level of internationally guaranteed rights,
whereas the rights of nonminorities remained solely within the domestic sphere. Also, critics of the League system perceived minority
rights as privileges. 59 But the PCIJ in the Minority Schools in Albania
case addressed this issue by drawing a distinction between equality in
law and equality in fact:
Equality in law precludes discrimination of any kind; whereas equality in fact may involve the necessity of different treatment in order to
attain a result which establishes an equilibrium between different
situations.
It is easy to imagine cases in which equality of treatment of the majority and of the minority, whose situation and requirements are different, would result in inequality in fact. .

.

. The equality between

members of the majority and of the minority must be an effective, genuine equality ....

60

55. Id. at 433-36. One of the objections to the minority system was that it provided a powerful tool for purposes other than protection of minorities. Jones, supra note 51, at 619. The
presence of a large, territorially compact, German minority in Czechslovakia, for example, facilitated Hitler's efforts to dismember Czechoslovakia in 1938. P. DE AZCARATE, LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND NATIONAL MINORITES 36-37 (1945); see Jan Mlynarik, The Nationality Question in
Czechoslovakia and the 1938 Munich Agreement, in CZECHOSLOVAKIA: CROSSROADS AND CRI-

sas, 1918-1988, at 89, 94-95 (Norman Stone & Edward Strouhal eds., 1989) (discussing the formulation of the Carlsbad program by Hitler and the leader of the Sudeten German Patriotic
Front, which "provided a platform on which it was easy to advance from Sudeten self-determination to aggression against Czechoslovakia."); see also Jones, supra note 51, at 610-26, for a discussion of the functions of the minority system.
56. Id. at 607 (citing the example of the Czechoslovak-Polish treaty relating to Silesia).
57. Thornberry, supra note 38, at 438.
58. Id. at 436-38.
59. Id. at 439-40.
60. Minority Schools in Albania, 1935 P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 64, at 19.
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Rather than deal directly with the minorities issue again, there was a
concern to eliminate minorities by redrawing boundaries and transferring populations, 6' as demonstrated by the expulsion of the large
German minorities from Poland and Czechoslovakia. 62 The disenchantment was also due in part to the way the League system had
63
been manipulated by the Nazis.
The United Nations replaced the idea of internationalizing the
rights of certain minority groups with the concept of universal human
rights on a nondiscriminatory basis. 64 The feeling was that if human
rights and fundamental freedoms were respected without discrimination, then protection of minority rights would not be a problem. This
was in part due to the influence of the United States, which emphasized its "melting pot" tradition, consistent with the dominant philos65
ophy of the time favoring assimilation.
The only "group right" recognized in the U.N. Charter is the principle of self-determination; 66 however, it is questionable whether the
U.N. Charter ever contemplated the question of minorities in its selfdetermination provision. The problem of minorities was seen more as
67
an issue of universal human rights than one of self-determination.
Article 1 of the U.N. Charter merely states that self-determination is a
61. Thornberry, supra note 38, at 438.
62. The expulsion of the German population from Czechoslovakia began in May 1945. The
Pottsdam Agreement of August 1945 sanctioned the organized expulsion of Germans from Poland, Hungary, and the Sudetenland in an effort to curb the violence that had characterized the
previous expulsions. Mlynarik, supra note 55, at 89, 99. A total of approximately 3 million
Germans were expelled from Czechoslovakia by late summer 1947. Id.
63. Humphrey, supra note 42, at 164; see also DE AZCARATE, supra note 55, discussing responsibility for the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia at the Munich conference in September
1938:
The mistake, or weakness, of those responsible lay in the fact that they allowed the question
to revolve around the situation of the German Minority. That was a grave error. Firstly
because it based the whole problem on a false and artificial attitude, and secondly because it
furnished Hitler with the easiest means of giving his plans a veneer of legitimacy.
Id. at 37. Hitler's interest in the German minority in Czechoslovakia, which was one premise of
the Munich conference, was purely pretextual. According to de Azcarate, Germany never
showed any concern for the Sudeten Germans until September of 1938. This contrasted sharply
with its position on the German minority in Poland, on which it was quite vocal. Id. at 37-38. It
was, according to de Azcarate, "impossible to prevent the governments from continuing to use
national minorities as an instrument with which to achieve certain political aims." Id. at 39.
64. CAPOTORTI, supra note 21, at 27.

65. See Humphrey, supra note 42, at 164; Thornberry, supra note 38, at 438-39; see also
Albert Blaustein, The New Nationalism, 30 AM. J. CoMP. L. 377, 378-79 (Supp. 1982) (asserting
that views that hold ethnicity or group consciousness to be a primitive stage of political and
social development were of short-lived popularity immediately following the establishment of the
United Nations).
66. U.N. CHARTER Art. 1(2) ("The purposes of the United Nations are ... [t]o develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.").
67. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 872; see INIs L. CLAUDE, JR., NATIONAL MINORITIES, AN
INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM 69-78 (1955).
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basis of "friendly relations among nations, '68 but does not elaborate
upon the content of the right. Some form of self-determination, however, is implicit in the U.N. Charter's provisions on non-self-governing
territories 69 and the international trusteeship system. 70 These provisions, however, explicitly refer to the administration of territory;71 the
language of the U.N. Charter does not address minorities without a
specific territorial base. 72 Since the U.N. Charter, then, the principle
of self-determination has been applied predominantly to peoples living
under colonial regimes.
The two U.N. covenants on human rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 73 and the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,74 developed the notion of selfdetermination further by classifying, to a certain extent, the scope of
the right and the relationship between the right of self-determination
and individual human rights.75 Thus article 1 of both Covenants
states that by virtue of the right to self-determination all peoples may
"freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development. ' 76 Some have argued, however, that it would be incorrect to take the article as meaning literally
"all people" since there are simply too many instances of peoples denied the right to self-determination. 77 The article goes on to say that
"States Parties ... shall promote the realization of the right of selfdetermination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations. '78 The right of selfdetermination, however, was still one for whole peoples and not sections of them and therefore did not extend self-determination to mi68. U.N. CHARTER Art. 1(2).
69. Id. ch. XI.
70. Id. ch. XII.
71. See id. Art. 73 ("the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a
full measure of self-government .... ); see also id. Art. 75 (providing for the establishment of "an
international trusteeship system for the administration and supervision of such territories").
72. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 872.
73. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14.
74. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 14.
75. Antonio Cassese, The Helsinki Declarationand Self-Determination, in HUMAN RIGHTS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD 83, 87 (Thomas Buergenthal ed., 1977).
76. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 1; Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights, supra note 14, art. 1.
77. Emerson, supra note 9, at 462. The examples he mentions are: Germans, Koreans,
Vietnamese, Biafrans, south Sudanese, the Baltic peoples, Formosans, Somalis, Kurds, and
Armenians. Since Emerson's article, both Covenants have come into force and are binding on
the parties, although many exceptions still exist.
78. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 1; Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights, supra note 14, art. 1.
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norities. 79 The Covenants reflect the view that if the community does
not freely determine its political status then individual human rights
can have little content.8 0 While the obligation is vague, by linking the
right of self-determination to the free choice of the people, the Covenants sanction both internal and external self-determination. External
self-determination is to apply to non-self-governing and trust territories, but States Parties are also to recognize the right to self-determination within their own territory. 8 1 This was the first step away from the
idea that the right of self-determination applied only in the context of
82
decolonization.
The Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities was able to get article 27 on minorities inserted into the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is historically significant because it is the first international norm dealing
specifically with the rights of ethnic, religious, and linguistic groups
that is capable of and intended for universal application.8 3 Article 27
of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights spells out the rights of
minorities. These rights, however, are phrased negatively, rather than
positively: the right to "not be denied the right... to enjoy their own
culture ... ." The rights granted by article 27 are more limited than
the rights of the people itself, but are those essential to defend minority identity against assimilation. 4 They are vested in the "persons belonging to such minorities ...in community with other members of
their group"'8 5 and are thus rights vested in individual members of the
group, rather than the group as such, although it does acknowledge
the importance of membership in the group. Article 27 appears to
require only that States tolerate minorities and refrain from interfering
with their cultural or religious practices, 86 rather than impose positive
79. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 880.
80. Cassese, supra note 75, at 87.
81. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. I; Covenant on Economic,
Cultural and Social Rights, supra note 14, art. 1; Cassese, supra note 75, at 87.
82. Cassese, supra note 75, at 87.
83. The full text of article 27 reads:
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging to
such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of their
group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to use their
own language.
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art 27, 999 U.N.T.S. at 179 (1976); see
Thornberry, supra note 3, at 883. The Subcommission tried to have an article on minorities
inserted into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (1948), but was unsuccessful. CAPOTORTI, supra note 21, at 27.

84. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 880.
85. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 14, art. 27.
86. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 881.
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duties, although it is arguable that in order to effectively implement
article 27, States would have to move from equality in law, or nondiscrimination, to equality in fact.8 7 The Covenant on Social, Economic
and Cultural Rights contains a provision on the individual's right to
take part in cultural life,8 8 but not the right to use a language. Like
article 27 of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, it is a right
vested in the individual and not a group right to cultural life.
The 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations 9 reaffirms the right to selfdetermination of peoples, but echoes the more limited views of selfdetermination as a means of achieving peaceful international relations:
[e]very State has the duty to promote... and to render assistance to the
United Nations in carrying out the responsibilities entrusted to it by the
Charter regarding the implementation of the principle [of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples], in order . . . [t]o promote friendly
relations and co-operation among States... and... [t]o bring a speedy
end to colonialism..

..

The principle remains vague; it grants that "all peoples have the right
freely to determine, without external interference, their political status[,]" 9 1t but arguably this only grants self-determination in the sense
of the right to freedom from external interference and is thus the right
of the State to nonintervention rather than a right vested in the people. 92 The Declaration goes on to reaffirm the principle of territorial
integrity, also limiting the notion of internal self-determination, provided the State complies "with the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples... and [is] thus possessed of a government
representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed or colour." 93 Given the wording of the provision, which places the requirement of a government representing the
people within a racial context, Cassese has argued that the Declaration
limits the applicability of the principle of internal self-determination to
peoples living under a racist regime and grants to them the right to be
free from systematic racial or religious discrimination and not the
right of a people in a sovereign State to elect and keep a government of
87. Id.
88. Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 14, art. 15(1 1)(a).
89. G.A Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28 at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028
(1971) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration].
90. Id. at 123-24.
91. Id. at 123.
92. Cassese, supra note 75, at 89.
93. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 89, at 124.
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their own choosing. 94 The political conditions required to fulfill the
principle of self-determination under the Declaration are quite minimal9 5 and do not provide for any protection of "the people" as a distinct group or community. In addition, the affirmation of the principle
of territorial integrity could be interpreted to deny that a segment of a
population of a State can be a people, or, even if it is a people, to deny
it the right to self-determination. 96 On the other hand, the Declaration states that in addition to the establishment of an independent
State, "the free association or integration with an independent State or
the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a
people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people[,] ' ' 97 thus recognizing that there are ways other
98
than full independence to implement the right of self-determination.
The resolution, therefore, does theoretically admit that the principle of
self-determination is applicable to peoples within an existing State,
although the threshold requirement of self-determination is low.
Nonetheless it does make the guarantee of territorial integrity contingent upon the existence of a representative government. 99 As a General Assembly resolution the Friendly Relations Declaration itself has
no binding legal force, 1°° although the provisions regarding peoples
living under colonial rule or a racist regime have become principles of
customary international law.' 0
Self-determination has also been addressed in Europe through the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) process.
The provisions of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, 10 2 which was adopted
at a summit level meeting of CSCE countries, are meant to apply to
94. CASSESE, supra note 6, at 134; Cassese, supra note 75, at 90-91. Rosenstock, however,

read the text to affirm the necessity of representative government to the principle of self-determination in general. Robert Rosenstock, The Declaration of Principlesof InternationalLaw Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey, 65 AM. J.INT'L L. 713, 732 (1971).
95. Cassese, supra note 75, at 89-90.
96. Van Dyke, supra note 33, at 4.

97. Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 89, at 124.
98. Rosenstock, supra note 94, at 731.

99. Thornberry, supra note 3, at 876. The United States and the United Kingdom both
proposed drafts more directly linking the concept of self-determination to the existence of repre-

sentative government. The more hesitant wording of the provision as it appeared in the Declaration was the result of a compromise with the Third World States. POMERANCE, supra note 5, at

38-39.
100. See CASSESE, supra note 6, at 192-95, for a discussion of the role of General Assembly

resolutions in international law-making.
101. SUREDA, supra note 3, at 226; CASSESE, supra note 6, at 134; Cassese, supra note 75, at
92; see also POMERANCE, supra note 5, at 63.

102. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, reprinted
in DEP'T STATE BULL. Sept. 1, 1975, at 323 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act].

Self-Determination and the CSFR

Fall 1991]

the participating States.'0 3 Self-determination in the CSCE context,
therefore, does not refer to the case of decolonization. The CSCE process leading up to Helsinki was, for the Soviet Union, largely an att°4
tempt to get Western recognition of its postwar position in Europe,
while the West hoped it would be an opportunity to discuss humanita-

rian issues and confidence building measures. 10 5 These divergent goals
demonstrate the different approaches of East and West to the notion of
self-determination; they embody the different principles of freedom
from external interference and of individual rights and representative

government.

0

6

Arguably, a large portion of the conference was con-

cerned with external self-determination, including the principle of
nonintervention, 10 7 by the tacit recognition of Soviet hegemony over
Eastern Europe. It did, however, raise the issue of self-determination
outside the context of decolonization. This necessarily raised the question of internal self-determination, 10 8 which is particularly important
for contemporary Eastern Europe.
The document is thus unique, as it stresses that the principle of
self-determination applies to all peoples and is a continuing right, 1 9
and because it guarantees both internal and external self-determination of peoples.' 10 As with the other documents relating to the right
103. The CSCE participating States are: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Cyprus,
Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the Holy
See, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey,
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, and
Yugoslavia. Albania is an observer country. Conference on the Security and Co-operation in
Europe: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension,
reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305, 1306 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Conference].
104. Harold S. Russell, The Helsinki Declaration: Brobdingnagor Lilliput?,70 AM. J. INT'L
L. 242, 244 (1976). This included U.S. recognition of the German Democratic Republic, which
occurred during stage two of the conference. Id.
105. Id. at 245.
106. See supra notes 6-10 and accompanying text.
107. Principle III of the Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations Between Participating
States reads:
The participating States regard as inviolable all one another's frontiers as well as the frontiers of all States in Europe and therefore they will refrain now and in the future from
assaulting these frontiers.
Accordingly they will also refrain from any demand for, or act of, seizure and usurpation of part or all of the territory of any participating state.
Helsinki Final Act, supra note 102, at 324-25. However, some commentators feel that the Soviet
Union largely failed in its objective of obtaining general Western acceptance of existing frontiers
and that the Final Act did not recognize those frontiers in Europe. Russell, supra note 104, at
249. Whether the principle of inviolability of frontiers would appear in the Final Act as an
independent concept was a major issue of the negotiations. Id. at 251.
108. Cassese, supra note 75, at 93-94.
109. Id. at 100.
110. Thomas Buergenthal, InternationalHuman Rights Law and the Helsinki Final Act:
Conclusions, in HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI ACCORD, supra
note 75, at 3, 9.
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to self-determination, principle VIII of the Helsinki Final Act reaffirms the principle of territorial integrityI and the significance of selfdetermination "for the development of friendly relations."' 12 Principle VIII also states that "all peoples always have the right, in full free1 13
dom, to determine ... their internal and external political status."
The scope of "peoples" in principle VIII was not intended to include
"national minorities;" '1 14 it extends the right of self-determination only
to groups living in and identifying with sovereign States.' 15 Principle
VII of the Final Act addresses respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and incorporates minority rights. The protection for
minorities is thus weaker in the Final Act than in the Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights; it provides only for their equality before the
law and "actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms" 1 16 without any protection for their right to maintain a separate
identity. 117
The leaders of the CSCE States met in Paris in November 1990 at
the first summit level meeting of CSCE since the adoption of the Helsinki Final Act. The Charter of Paris' 18 reaffirmed the principles of
the Final Act,' 19 including "the equal rights of peoples and their right
of self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant norms of international law including those
relating to territorial integrity of [S]tates."' 120 However, the principles
of territorial integrity and political independence were also reaffirmed,
as in the Helsinki Final Act, within the context of the prohibition on
the use of force. 12 1 The Charter of Paris reflects a renewed concern
with democracy as the basis of international security.122 In addition to
reaffirming the principle of self-determination and nondiscrimination
as a basis for peace and security, the Charter also refers to "the advancement of democracy, and respect for and effective exercise of
111. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 102, at 325.
112. Id. at 326.
113. Id.
114. Cassese, supra note 75, at 101.
115. Id. at 102.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.

Helsinki Final Act, supra note 102, at 325.
Thornberry, supra note 3, at 886.
Charter of Paris, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190 (1991).
Id. at 196.
Id. at 197.

121. Id. at 196 ("we renew our pledge to refrain from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State..."); Helsinki Final Act, supra note
102, at 324 ("The participating States will refrain ...

from the threat or use of force against the

territorial integrity or political independence of any State..
122. Charter of Paris, supra note 118, at 196-97.
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human rights." 123
Like the Helsinki Final Act, the Charter of Paris was not deposited
with the Secretary General of the United Nations and was not intended to be a legally binding document, but it is nonetheless significant. It adapts the principles contained in the U.N. Charter to
conditions in Europe. 124 Although not legally binding, both were
products of summit level meeting and, especially in the case of the
Helsinki Final Act, long and arduous negotiations,1 25 and States are
1 26
held accountable.
E. Self-Determination After the Age of Decolonization: A New
Concern with "Minorities"?
Although in the period since the Second World War the problems
of peoples or groups under colonial domination have been at the forefront of international concern with group rights, the band of States
that were the subject of the League of Nations minorities treaties have
once again come to the fore of international attention 27 and there is a
growing concern with minorities. The only significant group right to
emerge since 1945 is the concept of self-determination and even that
concept has only developed into an accepted legal norm with regard to
decolonization. Although the international community hoped that a
regime of universal individual human rights would solve the problems
of minorities, the issue of group rights remains troublesome. Self-determination has arguably become relevant beyond the context of colonial or racist regimes and within Europe itself, even if not yet as a legal
norm. In addition, the concept has acquired a democratic content; in
other words, internal self-determination requires, at a minimum, a
measure of representation of the population by the government. Representative democracy, like self-determination, is a complex concept; it
is relatively simple to adopt as a goal, but more difficult to determine
123. Id. at 197.
124. Cassese, supra note 75, at 105.
125. See generally Russell, supra note 104.
126. Cassese, supra note 75, at 106-07; see, e.g., Craig R. Whitney, Sign of World Transformed: A Rights Meeting in Moscow, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1991, at A5 ("'We are arriving at
the conclusion that national guarantees in this area are not sufficient,' the new Soviet Foreign
Minister, Boris D. Pankin, said the other day [refering to CSCE]. 'So we have to review the
principle of noninterference in affairs of other governments.' ").
127. The belt of minority States covered under the League of Nations minorities treaties were
Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Rumania,
Bulgaria, Albania, Greece, Turkey, and Iraq. See Jacob Robinson, InternationalProtection of
Minorities: A Global View, I ISRAEL Y.B. HUM. RTs. 61, 63-68 (1971). For contemporary developments in these States, see, e.g., Yugoslavia's Ethnic FightingBegins to Look Like War, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, § 4, at 3; Clyde Haberman, The Kurds: In Flight, Once Again, N.Y. TIMES,
May 5, 1991, § 6, at 34.
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the mechanisms of representation. This section will explore the new
concern with minorities and various legal solutions to the problems of
multiethnic and multilingual states, before going on in part II to explore the experience of Czechoslovakia in dealing with these problems.
The CSCE process has begun to recognize the problems of minorities. The Helsinki Final Act briefly addresses minority rights in principle VII. 128 The CSCE process, in the wake of the changes in Central
and Eastern Europe over the past two years, has shown a renewed
interest in minorities. The Charter of Paris affirms that the "ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities will be
protected and that persons belonging to national minorities have the
right freely to express, preserve and develop that identity without any
discrimination and in full equality before the law."' 129 The Charter
agrees to implement the provisions of the document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, part IV of
0
which is devoted exclusively to the problems of national minorities.13
It further provides for the meeting of experts on national minorities,
which was held July 1 to 19, 1991.131 Under "Guidelines for the Future" the Charter states that "friendly relations among our peoples, as
well as peace, justice, stability and democracy, require that the ethnic,
cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities be protected and conditions for the promotion of that identity be created[,]' 32 and that "the rights of persons belonging to national
minorities must be fully respected as part of universal human
133
rights."'
The emerging rubric for a solution of the minorities problem emphasizes democracy. Human rights play a complementary, rather
than a primary, role. 134 The emphasis remains, however, on individuals rather than minority groups. Part IV speaks of "persons belonging
128. Helsinki Final Act, supra note 102, Principle VII provides:

The participating States on whose territory national minorities exist will respect the right of
persons belonging to such minorities to equality before the law, will afford them the full
opportunity for the actual enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms and will,

in this manner, protect their legitimate interests in this sphere.
Id. at 325.
129. Charter of Paris, supra note 118, at 195.
130. Id. at 199. For a citation to the Document of the Copenhagen Meeting, see 29 I.L.M.
1305 (1990) [hereinafter Copenhagen Conference].
131. Charter of Paris, supra note 118, at 199.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Copenhagen Conference, supra note 130, part IV, $ 30 ("The participating States recognize that the questions relating to national minorities can only be satisfactorily resolved in a
This framework guarantees full respect for human rights
democratic political framework ....
and fundamental freedoms, equal rights and status for all citizens, the free expression of all their
legitimate interests and aspirations, [and] political pluralism .... ").
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to national minorities"1 35 and generally vests rights in those persons
and not the group itself.1 36 There is, however, some recognition of the
group rights aspect of minority protection; participating States
pledged to "protect the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of national minorities on their territory and create conditions for
the promotion of that identity." 1 37 The document also recognized the
importance of language rights,1 38 while still allowing States to require
that linguistic minorities learn the official language.' 39 Especially interesting, considering that most definitions of minority do not have a
territorial aspect,' 4° is paragraph 35, in which
The participating States note the efforts undertaken to protect and create
conditions for the promotion of the ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious identity of certain national minorities by establishing, as one of the
possible means to achieve these aims, appropriate local or autonomous
administrations corresponding to the specific historical and territorial
circumstances of such4 minorities and in accordance with the policies of
the State concerned.1 1
The participating States are, however, careful to reaffirm the principle
of territorial integrity within the context of the discussion of national
minorities. 142
As was at least alluded to in the Friendly Relations Declaration,
the right to self-determination can be exercised in ways other than
complete independence. 43 The challenge is to arrive at a legal and
political status which will satisfy the demands of a group for cultural
preservation and self-determination that is also compatible with the
existing international system, the principle of territorial integrity, and
the needs of existing states. Van Dyke suggests three possible statuses:
the granting of a measure of autonomy (e.g., federation), the guarantee
of a degree of political power to defend or promote group interests, or
the giving of special assurances. 144 The third type of status is analogous to those guarantees given under the League minority treaty system. The other statuses are most appropriate for States composed of
135. Id. 7 30-32, 34, 35, & 38.
136. Id.
137. Id. 1 33; see also id. 32.6 ("Persons belonging to national minorities can exercise and
enjoy their rights individually as well as in community with other members of their group.").
138. Id. 7 32.1 (private and public use of native language), 32.5 (dissemination, exchange,
and access to information in their native language) & 34 (instruction of and in their native language and its use before public authorities).
139. Id. $ 34.

140. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
141. Copenhagen Conference, supra note 130, part IV, 36 (emphasis added).
142. Id. $ 37.

143. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
144. Van Dyke, supra note 33, at 5-6.
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several "peoples," such as the CSFR. Such composite States are called
plural societies and are often thought to be incapable of supporting
stable democracies.1 4 5 The challenge of both human rights and constitutional theory is to devise a way to accommodate the needs of these,
different groups for autonomy and the needs of the international system for cohesive States that exercise some degree of control over their
populations. This is especially important for the CSFR (and other
countries in Central and Eastern Europe) if they wish eventually to
become part of the European Communities, which will not accept internal divisions as a reason for not implementing its directives.1'4
Nationalism and increasing demands for autonomy, however, are
unlikely to disappear. In fact, Hurst Hannum has argued that it is
precisely the lack of responsiveness on the part of States to the needs
of minorities and other distinct groups that has contributed to the
growth of nationalism.147 Finding a way to accommodate the needs of
peoples and other groups for some measure of autonomy or self-government is also necessary for the promotion of human rights and democracy. Very few nations are ethnically or culturally homogeneous,
and the attempts to create homogeneity are in fact likely to lead to
repression and human rights violations.' 48 Democratic theory has
also addressed this problem through the theory of "consociational democracy." This is a form of democracy that aims at accommodating
49
the needs of plural societies and providing for political stability.
Consociational democracies are composed of four elements: a "grand
coalition" of political leaders representative of the different groups in
the society; the presence of a mutual veto for the protection of minority interests; proportionality in political representation and appointment; and a high degree of autonomy for each group in running its
50
internal affairs.'
One constitutional arrangement that affords distinct groups a degree of internal autonomy to accommodate cultural diversity is federalism.' 5' It is probably better able than other systems, Brownlie has
145. See supra note I and accompanying text.
146. Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E Duobus
Unum?, 58 U. CI. L. REV. 511, 530 (1991).
147. HANNUM, supra note 4, at 23.
148. Id. at 26.
149. LuPHART, supra note 1, at 1-2.
150. Id. at 25.
151. Id. at 41-42; Brownlie, supra note 24, at 6; see also DANIEL J. ELAZAR, EXPLORING
FEDERALISM (1987); Koen Lenaerts, Constitutionalism and the Many Faces of Federalism, 38
AM. J. COMP. L. 205 (1990); Eric Stein, Uniformity and Diversity in a Divided-Power System:
The United States' Experience, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1081 (1956). Viktor Knapp has argued that
the socialist States have used federalism as a way of dealing with the nationalities problem, mak-
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argued, to provide a regime of stable autonomy which provides group
freedom within a wider legal and political system and harmonizes the
principle of nationality and the ideas of genuine coexistence of
52
peoples. 1
In the Czechoslovak context an accommodation of the needs of the
Slovaks has already been attempted in the form of a federation, and
the Czechs and Slovaks are currently trying to work out a compromise
that will balance the Slovak desire for a measure of autonomy with the
need of the Czechs and Slovaks to coexist in a single nation state and
ultimately as one country.
II.

THE CZECH AND SLOVAK EXPERIENCE

Having explored the development of the concepts of self-determination and minority rights, this section will explore the development
of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks and its reflection in the
evolving constitutional structure that has shaped and continues to
shape their relations.
The Czech and Slovak Federal Republic is located in central Europe. It borders on the Soviet Union in the east, Germany on the
west, Poland to the north, Austria to the southwest, and Hungary to
the southeast. The two primary ethnic groups are the Czechs, composing approximately two-thirds of the population, and the Slovaks,
composing about one-third of the population. There are also significant minority populations of Hungarians and Gypsies and a small
German-speaking minority. Slovakia lies in the eastern part of the
country; its capital is Bratislava. The Czech Lands, composed of Bohemia and Moravia, occupy the western two-thirds of the territory of
the CSFR. Bohemia occupies the westernmost portion of the Czech
Lands. The capital of Bohemia is Prague, which is also the Federal
capital. The capital of Moravia is Brno.
A.

Before the First World War' 53 ,

Both the Czechs and the Slovaks were subjects of the Austro-Huning specific reference to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Viktor Knapp, Socialist Federation- A Legal Means to the Solution of the Nationality Problem: A Comparative
Study, 82 MIcH. L. REV. 1213 (1984). While it is true that the socialist countries have used
federalism in dealing with their minority problems, it is worth noting that what until 1989 comprised the East Bloc, was also the "fault zone" covered by the minority treaties under the League
of Nations. See Robinson, supra note 127.
152. Brownlie, supra note 24, at 6.
153. This section is adapted from Victor S. Mamatey, The Establishment of the Republic, in
A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC 1918-1948, at 7 (Victor S. Mamatey & Radomir
Luza eds., 1973) and Joseph F. Zacek, Problems of Slovak Nationalism, in 1 STUDIES IN
CZECHOSLOVAK HISTORY 125 (Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. ed., 1976).
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garian Empire prior to World War I. The Austro-Hungarian Empire
was split between Austria and Hungary in 1867 in what was called the
A usgleich. The Czech Lands fell within the Austrian half of the empire and Slovakia within the Hungarian half. Following the A usgleich
the Hungarian government adopted a policy of Magyarization which
sought to create an ethnically and culturally homogeneous Magyar
state.' 54 This policy was carried out through a process of cultural and
linguistic assimilation. In Slovakia under Hungarian rule there was no
Slovak university, and in 1874 the three existing Slovak secondary
schools were closed; by 1879 Hungarian was mandatory in all elementary schools.' 5 5 In addition, Hungary's industrial revolution did not
begin until the end of the nineteenth century and Slovakia, as part of
Hungary, was primarily an agrarian State. Unlike the Czech Lands,
Slovakia did not have an industrial working class or, more importantly, a middle class.' 56 Hungary never adopted a policy of universal
male suffrage and by 1910 only six percent of the population had the
right to vote.' 57 Slovak cultural and political life in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries was severely curtailed by these Hungarian
policies.
The Austrian half of the empire was, comparatively, far more progressive. Unlike the cultural awakening in Slovakia, the nineteenth
century Czech national revival was not repressed and the Czechs aggressively revived their national and cultural heritage. In 1907 universal male suffrage was adopted in the Austrian part of the empire,
58
ensuring the Czechs of representation in the Reichsrat in Vienna,
and giving Czechs experience in parliamentary politics. At this time
Czech officials were also advancing within the Austrian civil service. 159 Thus the sense of national identity and self-assurance was far
greater in the Czech Lands than in Slovakia when World War I provided the opportunity for independence, and there were a greater
number of Czechs than Slovaks with experience in government

administration. 160
154. Mamatey, supra note 153, at 7.
155. JOSEF E. KORBEL, TWENTIETH-CENTURY CZECHOSLOVAKIA 89 (1977).
156. Mamatey, supra note 153, at 5.

157. Id. at 8.
158. Gisbert H. Flanz, Czechoslovakia, ConstitutionalChronology at 2 (1974), in CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD (Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1974)

[hereinafter Constitutional Chronology].
159. Id.
160. For the importance of this in later politics, see infra notes 211-12 and accompanying
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B.

The Foundation of the Czechoslovak Republic

Both Czechs and Slovaks had long aspired to independence, or at
least some form of autonomy. World War I, the crumbling of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire, and the culmination of nineteenth century
nationalism came together to provide them with the opportunity for
independence. On October 28, 1918, the provisional National Council
in Prague proclaimed the existence of an independent Czechoslovak
State. While various schemes for Czech and Slovak independence
were contemplated during the war, 16 1 the newly independent Czecho162
slovakia, as approved by the Allies in the Treaties of Versailles,
Saint-Germain, t63 and Trianon, 164 was formed under the leadership of
Thomas G. Masaryk. Masaryk had been elected by the National
Council in Prague while he was in the United States. The creation of
an independent Czechoslovakia had been supported by the Allies and
others, including Czech and Slovak groups in the United States. On
May 30, 1918, Masaryk had signed an agreement with representatives
of Slovak and Czech organizations in the United States. This agreement, known as the Pittsburgh Agreement, envisioned a degree of autonomy for Slovakia. It stipulated that Slovakia should have its own
legislature, courts, and administration and that Slovak would be the
official language, although it left the detailed provisions for Slovak autonomy to be decided by representatives of the Czechs and Slovaks
after the War. 65 The Czechoslovak Republic, however, was estab66
lished as a unitary State.'
On November 13, 1918 the provisional constitution was
161. See CZECHOSLOVAKIA: CROSSROADS AND CRISES, supra note 55, at 11-88.

162. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany, June 28,
1919, ch. 1, arts. 80-86, 2 Bevans 43, 87-89 [hereinafter Treaty of Versailles].
163. Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and Associated Powers and Austria, Sept. 10, 1919,
part III, § III, art. 53, III Redmond 3149, 3174 [hereinafter Treaty of Saint-Germain].
164. Treaty of Peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, June 4, 1920,
part III, § IV, art. 48, 1II Redmond 3539, 3562 [hereinafter Treaty of Trianon].
165. The Pittsburgh Agreement is reprinted in JOZEF LETTRICH, HISTORY OF MODERN
SLOVAKIA 289-90 (1955). The Slovak Populist Andrej Hlinka made the Pittsburgh Agreement
the cornerstone of his policy until his death in 1938. Vaclav L. Benes, Czechoslovak Democracy
and its Problems 1918-20, in A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC 1918-1948, supra
note 153, at 39, 84. President Thomas Masaryk said of the Pittsburgh Agreement:

I signed the [Pittsburgh Agreement] unhesitatingly as a local understanding between American Czechs and Slovaks upon the policy they were prepared to advocate ....
[I]t was laid
down that the details of the Slovak political problem would be settled by the legal representatives of the Slovak people themselves.... And so it was. The Constitution was adopted by
the Slovaks as well as by the Czechs. The legal representatives of Slovakia thus expressed
themselves in favor of complete union, and the oath sworn upon the constitution binds the
Slovaks, the Czechs and me too.
THOMAS G. MASARYK, THE MAKING OF A STATE 221 (1927).

166. Constitution of the Czecho-Slovak Republic § 3(1), translatedin 179 INTERNATIONAL
CONCILIATION 409 (Oct. 1922).
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adopted.167 All power was vested in a unicameral National Assembly,
which elected the Prime Minister and the Cabinet.168 The provisional
constitution was not adopted by an electoral body and it gave to the
provisional National Assembly the right to draft and adopt a permanent constitution. 169 Vavro Srobar, the only Slovak who signed the

proclamation of Czechoslovak statehood, selected the forty Slovak
deputies who were to represent the Slovak people in the provisional
National Assembly. 170 Half of these Slovak Deputies were Protestants, although Protestants constituted less than seventeen percent of
the Slovak population. 7 1 Srobar had no opportunity to consult with
anyone in Slovakia in choosing the Slovak delegation as Slovakia172was
in a state of disarray and partially occupied by the Hungarians.
The Slovak populists were dismayed by the lack of Slovak autonomy in the Czechoslovak Republic. On August 27, 1919, Andrej
Hlinka, one of the leaders of the Slovak Populists, and several others
left Czechoslovakia to attend the Paris peace conference. At the conference they submitted a memorandum 173 to the allied delegations demanding an international guarantee of Slovak autonomy in

Czechoslovakia similar to the one given to Ruthenia
T5

of Saint-Germain, Versailles, and Trianon.1

74

in the Treaties

They decried the oblit-

167. Constitutional Chronology, supra note 158, at 2.
168. Benes, supra note 165, at 55-56.
169. Id. at 54-55.
170. Id. at 56-58. Some sources say there were 44 Slovak representatives in the provisional
National Assembly. Constitutional Chronology, supra note 158, at 3.
171. Since the reformation there had been a split within the Slovak population between Protestants and Catholics. The Protestants tended to identify more with the Czechs. Slovak Protestants had, for example, used Czech as their liturgical language since the 16th century and had
been in favor of adopting Czech as the Slovak literary language in the 19th century. They mistrusted what they saw as the conservative influence of Catholicism on the Slovak people. Mamatey, supra note 153, at 8. They also believed in Czechoslovak identity and insisted that the
peoples were completely identical, despite having been separated for 1000 years of their history.
Id. The other important trend within the Slovak National Party was the Catholic-populist trend,
represented by the priest Andrej Hlinka. Prior to 1918, Father Hlinka endorsed the principle of
Czechoslovak unity, but became increasingly suspicious of Czech anticlericalism, and continually
sought greater autonomy for Slovakia. Id at 9. The Czechs tended to be suspicious of Slovak
Catholicism, in part because they identified their loss of national identity with the Catholic counterreformation. They tended to be secular in outlook and critical of the Catholic Church. Id.
172. Benes, supra note 165, at 56-58.
173. An English translation of this memorandum can be found in JOSEPH A. MIKUS,
SLOVAKIA, A POLITICAL HISTORY: 1918-1950, at 331-40 (1963) [hereinafter Versailles Memorandum]. The memorandum included the text of the Pittsburgh Agreement.
174. Ruthenia, sometimes known as Russinia, is ethnically Ukranian and was located in the
easternmost part of interwar Czechoslovakia. It became part of the Soviet Union after World
War II.
175. Versailles Memorandum, supra note 173, at 333, 338; see also Treaty of Versailles, supra
note 162, art. 81, 2 Bevans at 87; Treaty of Saint-Germain, supra note 163, art. 53, III Redmond
at 3174; Treaty of Trianon, supra note 164, art. 48, III Redmond at 3562. There was also a
treaty executed between the Allies and Czechoslovakia, pursuant to article 57 of the Treaty of
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eration of Slovak identity in the new Czechoslovak State,17 6 but the
Allied Powers had already drifted apart and they did not revise the
77
treaties to include a guarantee of Slovak autonomy.1
1. The 1920 Constitution
The Constitution of the newly created Czechoslovak State was
unanimously approved by the National Assembly on February 29,
1920. It provided for a unitary State and, in accordance with the
Peace Treaties, it contained guarantees for the autonomy of Ruthenia, t78 but not for Slovak autonomy. Even among the Slovaks, however, there had been some disagreement on the question of provincial
autonomy for Slovakia. The Slovak agrarians wished to postpone the
questions because they did not believe that the Slovak people were
ready for autonomy. 179 The Slovak populists were willing to postpone
the issue, recognizing that Slovakia was not yet ready for administrative and legislative autonomy, but wanted guarantees of future Slovak

autonomy inserted in the constitution.'8 0 The Slovak socialists were
opposed to autonomy.' 8 ' Many Slovak political leaders favored
Czechoslovak unity and fought against Slovak populist attempts at autonomy.' 8 2 When the National Assembly learned of the Slovak trip to
Paris demanding an international guarantee of Slovak autonomy,
Saint-Germain, regarding the protection of minorities. Articles 10 to 14 of this treaty elaborated
on the provisions for Ruthenian autonomy guaranteed in the Treaty of Saint-Germain. Treaty
between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Czechoslovakia, Sept. 10, 1919, arts.
10-14, III Redmond 3699, 3703-04 [hereinafter Appendix II]. The text of the Versailles Memorandum itself asked "for political autonomy, a national Slovak parliament, a Slovak government
responsible to this parliament, [and] our own administration and [magistrate]." Versailles Memorandum, supra note 173, at 338.
176. Versailles Memorandum, supra note 173, at 338, stated that "[t]here is not a CzechoSlovak nation, but there is a Czech nation and a Slovak nation. We are not Czechs nor CzechoSlovaks, but Slovaks, and we wish to remain Slovaks forever." Referring to article 57 of the
Treaty of Saint-Germain, which contained the obligation of the Czechoslovak State to protect
racial, religious and linguistic minorities on its territory, the memorandum asked that "the Allied
and Associated Powers envision [the Slovaks] as a minority different from the Czechs and to
protect our interests by guaranteeing us the greatest possible political autonomy." Id. This illustrates the lack of conceptual utility in attempting to draw these distinctions between peoples and
minorities as well as the difference in legal status these distinctions entail. See supra notes 24-28
and accompanying text.
177. Benes, supra note 170, at 85.
178. 1920 CONSTITUTION § 3.
179. Benes, supra note 165, at 93-94.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Victor S. Mamatey, The Development of Czechoslovak Democracy, 1920-1938, in A
HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, supra note 153, at 99, 121-22; see also Busek, The

Czechoslovak Constitutionsof 1920, 1948 and 1960, in THE CZECHOSLOVAK CONTRIBUTION TO
WORLD CULTURE at 396 (Miloslav Rechcigl, Jr. ed., 1964) (asserting that the unitary structure
of the 1920 Constitution reflected a genuine sense of national unity).
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Czech party leaders wondered whether the Slovaks could be trusted
with autonomy. 183 The Prague government also feared that Slovak
autonomy would provide Hungary with an opportunity to annex the
territory of Slovakia, which contained a considerable Hungarian population, and would lead to the disintegration of the Czechoslovak

state. 184
The 1920 Constitution provided that "the territories of the
Czecho-Slovak Republic shall form a united and indivisible unit[,]' 18 5
and that "[c]itizenship in the Czecho-Slovak Republic is single and
uniform."' 8 6 On the same day the National Assembly also adopted an
act "establishing the principle of language rights within the CzechoSlovak Republic"' 8 7 (the Language Law), which provided that the
"Czecho-Slovak language shall be the state, official language of the
Republic," although it is now recognized that Czech and Slovak are
88
separate languages, albeit closely related.'
The 1920 Constitution, in accordance with the Treaty of SaintGermain, 8 9 provided for a measure of self-government in Ruthenia
"compatible with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak Republic.... ."190 It
also provided that Ruthenia would have its own legislature, '1 which
had jurisdiction in linguistic, educational, and religious matters and in
193
domestic administration, 19 2 and its own governor.
. The 1920 Constitution was progressive in the rights that it granted
other minorities. It provided for equality before the law 94 and free
use of any language in private and business relations, in the press and
publications, and public assemblies. 195 It also provided that in areas
where there were "considerable fraction[s] of Czecho-Slovak citizens
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Benes, supra note 165, at 94.
Mlynarik, supra note 55, at 92.
1920 CONSTITUTION § 3(1).
Id. § 4(1).
Constitutional Act Establishing the Principle of Language Rights within the Czecho-

Slovak Republic, translated in INTERNATIONAL CONCILIATION No. 179, at 448 (Oct. 1922)

[hereinafter Language Law].
188. See AFTER THE REVOLUTION 52 (Tom D. Wipple ed., 1991); Benes, supra note 165, at

96; see also discussion, supra notes 171 and 201.
189. Treaty of Saint-Germain, supra note 163, art. 53; Appendix II, supra note 175, arts. 1014, III Redmond at 3703-04.

190. 1920 CONSTITUTION § 3(2).
191. Id.
192. Id. § 3(3). Section 6 of the Language Law, supra note 187, provided that the Ruthenian

parliament would have the right to "settl[e] the language question for this territory in a manner
consonant with the unity of the Czecho-Slovak State."

193. 1920 CONSTITUTION § 3(5).
194. Id. § 128(1).

195. Id.§ 128(3)
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speaking a language other than Czecho-Slovak,... due opportunity to
receive instruction in their own tongue" would be guaranteed, while
providing that education in "the Czecho-Slovak language ... may be
prescribed as a compulsory subject of instruction." 196 The Language
Law, in accordance with the Treaty of Saint-Germain, provided that
in districts where twenty percent of the citizens spoke the same language, courts and government organs and offices would be required to
conduct business in that other language, in addition to the official language. 197 In these regions, public prosecutors would have to frame
charges against the accused in this language, and the minority language would be used concurrently with the official language in procla198
mations and notices issued by State courts, offices, and organs.
Slovak populists were disappointed with the constitution because it
provided for a unitary Czechoslovak State and ignored Slovakia's
identity. Because the Slovaks were not recognized as a nationality separate from the Czechs, it was unclear whether the provision regarding
protection of minorities applied to them. Slovak populists agreed to
vote for the constitution only after registering a reservation that their
vote should "in no way prejudice their demand for Slovak autonomy
with a legislative diet" in the future.199 Hlinka and the Slovak Populists continued to demand Slovak autonomy. Slovak populists introduced their first bill for Slovak autonomy in the National Assembly in
January 1922, but it was overwhelmingly defeated. 2°° Slovak centralists and autonomists continually fought one another over the issue of
''one nation or two" and the "battle of the hyphen" over whether the
name of the country should be spelled with the hyphen (CzechoSlovakia) as in the wartime documents and peace treaties or without a
hyphen (Czechoslovakia), as became popular after the war. 20 1 The
Czech politicians backed the centralists, but avoided direct conflict
196. Id. § 131.
197. Language Law, supra note 187, § 2.
198. Id.
199. Benes, supra note 170, at 96-97 (citation omitted).
200. Mamatey, supra note 182, at 121.
201. Id. at 125-26. Another example of the tensions both between Czechs and Slovaks and
between Slovak Populists and Slovak Centralists is the language issue. In 1932, the Minister of
Education, Derer, a Slovak centralist, attempted to undertake a reform of the Slovak language.
A new grammar was prepared by the Slovensko Matica (the Slovak Cultural Institute) with the
assistance of the Czech academy in Prague, which reflected a conscious effort to render the
Slovak language as close to Czech as possible. The Slovaks had long been deprived of the use of
their language under the Hungarians and were very sensitive about their language and their right
to use it. At the Matica's annual meeting on May 12, 1932, the opponents of the new grammar

won and the czechophiles were ousted from the Matica. In retaliation Derer ordered school
authorities to use the grammar anyway. Id. at 150.
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with the Slovaks.20 2
2.

Administrative and Economic Developments under
the First Republic

The separation of the economies of the Czech Lands and Slovakia
from the Austro-Hungarian Empire caused economic dislocations
throughout the Czechoslovak Republic.20 3 These economic hardships
were felt more keenly in Slovakia than in the Czech Lands, causing
tension between the two groups. As mentioned earlier, Hungary did
not enter the industrial revolution until the end of the nineteenth century. Slovak industry was relatively well developed in comparison to
Hungary, 204 but not in comparison to Czech industry, since Bohemia
had been the center of the Austrian industrial revolution. As a result
of separation from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, both regions lost a
substantial part of their markets, 20 5 but the older, better capitalized,
and more efficient Czech industries weathered the postwar crisis better
than Slovak industry. 2°6 In addition much of Slovak industry had
been owned by Hungarians and most of Slovak commerce and industry passed into the control of Prague banks.2 0 7 These economic developments forced Slovakia back into the status of an agrarian province
vis-i-vis the industrial Czech lands. When Czechoslovakia was forced
by economic conditions to curtail industrial production, Czech banks
shut down the less profitable and less efficient factories in Slovakia
first. From 1918 to 1923 over 200 plants in Slovakia were shut
down. 20 8 The result of this was an intensification of rural overpopulation and unemployment or underemployment. 20 9 Thus the economic
consequence of independence hit Slovakia harder2 10 and generated resentment on the part of the Slovaks toward the more fortunate Czechs.
202. Id. at 126.
203. Id. at 114.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 115.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 116.
209. Id. at 117.
210. Id. at 114-17. Under the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic the official Communist view
perceived the nationality problem in primarily economic terms: "[i]n this official view socialism
had eradicated nationalism in principle by opting for a policy of economic equalization and a
commensurate ideological campaign instructing the new socialist man that his nationalist loyalties were artificial and were based on a defensive response to an earlier policy of economic discrimination and exploitation." ROBERT W. DEAN, NATIONALISM AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN
EASTERN EUROPE: THE SLOVAK QUESTION AND THE CZECHOSLOVAK REFORM MOVEMENT at

2 (Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol. 10, no. 1, 1972-73); see also id.at 21-24. As this
account shows it was not necessarily a matter of exploitation or underdevelopment, but rather a
consequence of other developments over a long period of time. More important than the root
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Another factor causing resentment was the fact that most government posts were held by Czechs, even in Slovakia. This stemmed from
the fact that because of Slovakia's history there were simply not
enough qualified Slovaks to fill government positions in proportion to
their size in the population. 2 11 Particularly during the depression
when unemployment was especially high in Slovakia, resentment of
2 12
Czech officials serving in Slovakia was acute.
C. Munich and an "Independent" Slovakia
The government tended to underestimate the influence of the
populists. Malypetr, Prime Minister from October 1932 to February
1934, did not invite them into the cabinet and, left in opposition, they
became more radical in the 1930s. 2 13 On May'8, 1930, the Slovak
populists introduced the second bill for Slovak autonomy in the National Assembly, which failed as well. 2 14 While Slovak populists were
unsuccessful in their demands for autonomy in the National Assem21 5
bly, by the 1930s Slovak politics had acquired a broader base.
In 1938, Hitler was able to manipulate Czechoslovakia's other vocal minority, the Germans, in order to annex the Sudetenland. The
growing support in Slovakia for autonomy aided German efforts to
split Czechoslovakia. 21 6 In June of 1938, the Slovak People's Party
again demanded autonomy and presented these demands to the National Assembly on August 17 of that year. 217 They asked for the recognition of the individuality of the Slovak people, exclusive use of the
Slovak language in Slovakia, and the creation of an autonomous
Slovak legislature. After the Munich conference of September 29 and
30, 1938, where Germany was given the Sudetenland, the weak position of Prague gave the Slovak autonomists the opportunity to renew
their demands. 2 18 On November 11, 1938, Constitutional Law No.
299/1938, providing for Slovak autonomy, was promulgated. 21 9 On
March 14, 1939, the Slovak legislature unanimously declared Slovak
cause of the disparity is the perception on the part of Slovaks of being underdeveloped and the
effect this has had on their national consciousness.
211. DEAN, supra note 210, at 5.
212. Mamatey, supra note 182, at 143-44.
213. Id. at 148-49.
214. Id. at 149; see also supra note 200 and accompanying text.
215. Mamatey, supra note 182, at 143-44.
216. Id. at 159-60.
217. Theodor Prochazka, The Second Republic, 1938-1939, in A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, supra note 153, at 260.

218. Id.
219. Constitutional Chronology, supra note 158, at 6.
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independence, 220 and on March 15, German troops occupied the remaining territory of Czechoslovakia, establishing the protectorate of
Bohemia and Moravia. 22 1 Slovakia, however, was now highly dependent on Nazi Germany. Initially Germany was content with tight
control of the Slovak army and did not interfere significantly with
purely internal affairs. 222 On July 19, 1939, however, the Slovak government had to promise to "continue directing domestic political development in Slovakia in a spirit unqualifiedly positive and friendly
towards Germany. ' ' 223 On August 18, 1939, Slovakia was placed
224
under German military control.
D.

The Czechoslovak Socialist Republic

In September 1943 the Slovak National Council was established
and in August 1944, the Slovak uprising occurred under its leadership. 225 Though unsuccessful, the uprising was important to the prestige of Slovakia and gave credibility to Slovak claims for selfgovernment after the war. 22 6 It also led to the negotiation of the Ko-

sice Program in April

1945.227

The Kosice Program provided that the

"Slovak National Council ... shall be... the representative of state
power in the territory of Slovakia. ' 228 The new government of the
Republic promised to "incorporate into the Constitution . . . the
Slovak legislature, governmental and executive organs, as they already
exist in the Slovak National Council, ' 229 and promised that "[t]he
Slovaks will be adequately represented, both in the central state offices,
institutions and economic agencies, both as to number and the impor'230
tance of their functions.
After World War II, Czechoslovakia had a coalition government
which included the Communist Party. In February 1948, the Communist Party staged a government crisis which led to the resignation
of twelve non-Communist members of the government. 23 1 In May of
220. Prochazka, supra note 217, at 268.
221. Constitutional Chronology, supra note 158, at 7.
222. Jdrg K. Hoensch, The Slovak Republic, 1939-1949, in A HISTORY OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC, supra note 153, at 271, 278.

223. Id. (quoting Documents of German Foreign Policy 1918-1945, Series D vol. VI, at 205).
224. Constitutional Chronology, supra note 158, at 7.
225. DEAN, supra note 210, at 5-6.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
1984).

Id.
Id. The Kosice Program is reprinted in LETrRICH, supra note 165, at 317-18.
Kosice Program, supra note 227, at 317-18.
Id. at 318.
Id.
COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE 117 (Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone ed., 2d ed.
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that year the non-Communist president refused to sign the new Constitution and resigned shortly thereafter. Klement Gottwald, head of
the Communist Party, then became president. 232 In July the new constitution was adopted.
1. The Constitution of 1948
Like the 1920 Constitution, the 1948 Constitution provided for a
unitary State, but acknowledged that it was composed of two nations:
Czech and Slovak. 233 The supreme legislative body was the unicameral National Assembly. 2 34 The new constitution provided for the
existence of Slovakia as a legally separate entity, by creating the
"Slovak National Organs. ' 235 The stated purpose of the Slovak National Organs was to "ensure ... the equality of Czechs and Slovaks
• . . [and] that equally favorable conditions be created for the economic, cultural and social life of both nations. ' 236 The Constitution
recognized the Slovak National Council as the legislative organ in
Slovakia 237 and created a Board of Commissioners, which was to exercise executive power in Slovakia. 23 8 The Board of Commissioners,
however, could be appointed and recalled by the government of the
Republic, i.e., the central government in Prague.2 39 The National Assembly had exclusive jurisdiction to decide on the constitutionality of
acts of the Slovak National Council, 24 0 and the Slovak National Coun24 1
cil was summoned and could be dismissed by the Prime Minister.
While the Slovak National Organs ostensibly had "legislative, gov242
ernmental and executive power" within the territory of Slovakia,
the powers of the Slovak National Council were not clearly defined
and the Constitution left ample room for central control. 24 3 It desig232. Id.
233. CONSTITUTION OF THE CZECHOSLOVAK REPUBLIC OF JUNE 9, 1948, art. Il(1), trans-

lated in CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 689 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 2d ed. 1956).
234. 1948 CONSTITUTION art. V.

235. Id. art. VIII(l) ("The State power in Slovakia is vested in and carried into effect and the
national individuality of the Slovak nation is represented by the Slovak National Organs.").
236. Id. art. VIII(2).
237. Id. art. IX(l).
238. Id. art. IX(2).
239. Id.
240. Id. § 65.
241. Id. § 102.
242. Id. § 93.
243. Id. § 94 ("The Slovak National Council shall discharge the legislative power (section
96) in matters of a national or regional character, provided that these matters require special
regulation so as to ensure the full development of the material and spiritual forces of the Slovak
nation, and provided that the said matters are not such as require uniform regulation by Act [of
the National Assembly].").
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nated a specific realm of competence to Slovak Organs with the State
holding residual power, 244 but the central government could act in any
of these areas where the National Assembly established the need for
uniform regulation, or where Slovak jurisdiction was inconsistent with
the needs of the economic plan. 245 There was no policy area where the

Slovak National Organs had exclusive authority. 246 In addition, the
central government had the right to introduce legislation in the Slovak
National Council and to participate in Slovak National Council
meetings.

247

The 1948 Constitution differed from the 1920 Constitution in that
it actually provided for institutional penetration of the Slovaks into the
State bureaucracy and policy making structure, but there was a crucial
difference from the situation under the 1920 Constitution. While there
was no actual institutional recognition of a separate Slovakia in the
interwar Czechoslovak Republic, there were at least periodic elections
which gave Slovak nationalists a check upon the centralists and allowed the legitimacy of state policy to be tested. Elections also provided public forums for the airing of nationalist grievances; this ceased
to be the case after 1948.248
The postwar Slovak political structure did not afford a meaningful
base of access for expression' or achievement of nationalist claims. 249
The Slovak political organs lacked both a clear area of jurisdiction 250
and the power toassert themselves. 25 1 Like the other countries in the
Soviet Bloc, Czechoslovakia followed a political course influenced by
Stalinism. Even in the post-Stalin period, the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia, under the leadership of Antonin Novotny (1953-68)
followed a conservative Communist approach. 25 2 During the 1950s
even the semblance of formal meetings of Slovak political organs disappeared. 253 National aspirations were not recognized as legitimate by
the Communist government. Such aspirations were seen primarily as
a throwback to the earlier era of imperialist and capitalist exploita244. Id. § 96.
245. Id. §§ 94, 110(2); CAROL SKALNIK LEFF, NATIONAL CONFLICT IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA
100-01 (1988).
246. LEFF, supra note 245, at 100-01; see, e.g., 1948 CONSTITUTION, supra note 233, §§ 117,
121, 122.
247. 1948 CONSTITUTION §§ 108, 105; LEFF, supra note 245, at 101.
248. LEFF, supra note 245, at 102-03.
249. Id. at 108.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 231, at 118.
253. LEFF, supra note 245, at 106. The Slovak National Council met fifteen times a year in
both 1948 and 1949. In the 1950s, however, it met an average of zero to four times a year. Id.

Fall 1991]

Self-Determination and the CSFR

tion.254 Party leaders who pushed for Slovak interests were called
"bourgeois nationalists." From 1950 to 1954, the wartime leaders of
the Slovak Communist Party, who had advocated some measure of
'255
autonomy for Slovakia, were arrested for "bourgeois nationalism."
2.

The 1960 Constitution

The 1960 Constitution was the first truly communist constitution
in Czechoslovakia, in that it incorporated the leading role of the Communist Party. 256 The reason for adopting the new constitution was to
reflect the consolidation of Communist power in Czechoslovakia
under the leadership of Novotny. Like its predecessors, the new constitution provided for a unitary State. 25 7 It no longer provided for the
Slovak Board of Commissioners, and narrowed the legislative power
of the Slovak National Council. 258 For example, the Slovak National
Council now had the authority to "enact laws of the Slovak National
Council where empowered to do so by law of the National Assembly[,]" 259 and to "discuss and approve the budget of the Slovak Na' ' 26
tional Council. 0
In the early 1960s, nationalist sentiment resurfaced and the question of leadership recruitment became a leading issue. Nationalist activity focused on pushing out the Slovaks who had been loyal to
Novotny and rehabilitating the "bourgeois nationalists" who had been
imprisoned during the 1950s. At the December 1963 meeting of the
Central Committee of the Communist Party, the Czechoslovak Communist Party officially repudiated "the fiction of so-called bourgeois
26 1
nationalism."
3. The 1968 Federation
In 1968 debate on the creation of a federation began and the
Slovak elite made it clear that the asymmetrical model was no longer
acceptable. They argued that the absence of equivalent Czech organs
inevitably put central institutions in the position of defending Czech
254. See discussion supra note 210.
255. DEAN, supra note 210, at 6. This included Gustav Husak who received a life sentence.
Husak was later rehabilitated. Id. at 7. He would become the leader of the Communist Party of
Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring, where he lead the harsh policy of "normalization" after
the Soviet invasion. Id. at 4.
256. CONSTITUTION OF JULY 11, 1960, art. 6, translated in 3 CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS

222, 228 (Amos J. Peaslee ed., 3d ed. 1968).
257. 1960 CONST. art. 1(2).
258. Id. art. 74; DEAN, supra note 210, at 7.
259. 1960 CONST. art. 74(b).
260. Id. art. 74(d).
261. LEFF,supra note 245, at 19.
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interests against the Slovaks. 262 The 1960 Constitution, having recentralized the government and subordinated Slovak governmental organs to the Prague center, frequently left the administration of Slovak
regions to those with little knowledge of Slovakia and its problems,
which only increased Slovak dissatisfaction with the central
government.

263

The Slovaks were not the only group dissatisfied with the highly
centralized and rigid regime under Novotny. Even during the period
of de-Stalinization ushered in by Nikita Khrushchev in 1956, Novotny
had been reluctant to "de-Stalinize" the country. 264 Novotny's conservative policies heightened social and political problems. This led to
a push for liberalization, beginning within the Party, in what became
known as the Prague Spring. 265 The debate on federation was part of
the Prague Spring reforms, and it was not a coincidence that this debate began at the same time as the debate on democratization; both
were crucial elements of the Prague Spring. The push for federalization was part of the central premise for democratization during 1968,
namely, that democratic ideals and intentions were meaningless without structural guarantees. 266 Federation was seen, in part, as a structural guarantee of the free assertion of national rights and national
autonomy. 2 67 The Slovaks adopted the metaphor of "democratization" in conceptualizing the nationality problem as one of equality
among nations; they saw the solution of the nationality problem as a
prerequisite to achieving a more democratic social and political order.26 8 During the Prague Spring, Slovak authorities attributed a high
priority "to achieving a symmetrical, binational federation through
constitutional reform. ' 269 Slovak intent was on strengthening Slovak
authority in its own territory with the hope of insulating Slovakia from
the central government in Prague. 270 The Czechs were less concerned
with national rights and more concerned with institutional pluralism
262. LEFF, supra note 245, at 122-23. As a result of the Slovak pressure, and as a prelude to
the creation of the federation, the Czech National Council was formed in June 1968. DEAN,
supra note 210, at 33.
263. DEAN, supra note 210, at 15.
264. COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 231, at 118.

265. Id.
266. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126. Institutional guarantees were not the only common concern. Similarly, it was Slovak demands for a certain degree of economic self-management and
the inability of the Novotny regime to respond to them constructively that helped bring down
Novotny in 1967. He was replaced by Alexander Dubcek, a Slovak. DEAN, supra note 210, at
26-27.
267. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126.
268. DEAN, supra note 210, at 11.
269. Id. at 28.
270. Id.
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and individual liberty. 27 t There were, within the general push for democratization and structural guarantees, different agendas which split
along national lines and often conflicted with one another.
One issue over which Czech and Slovak demands clashed was the
concept of majority rule. The Slovaks insisted that mere proportional
representation was insufficient because it would officially relegate the
Slovaks to minority status. Instead they sought parity in all legislative
and executive decision-making bodies. 272 Slovaks advocated a form of
democracy in which each recognized grouping would have veto
power. 273 A minority veto of some type is not uncommon in societies
composed of diverse communities. 274 The idea of a minority veto,
however, is fraught with certain difficulties. Democracy is most frequently associated with the concept of majority rule and this type of
veto is perceived as "minority rule."' 275 If one accepts the Slovak principle of "one nation, one vote," then this weighted representation is
consistent with democratic representation. 276 The Czechs, however,
did not accept the Slovak conception of democratic representation.
The Czech conception was based on a definition of representation that
designated the individual citizen and not the nation as the basis of
democracy; proportional representation, not parity, was at the core of
the Czech democratization effort. 277 Thus, what to the Slovaks was a
necessary and essential democratic safeguard, was to the Czechs a re278
pudiation of basic democratic principles.
271. Id. at 2, 28.
272. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126. Parity refers to the principle of having top government
positions equally divided between Czechs and Slovaks. It is a form of proportional representation. Proportionality is often used as a method of allocating scarce resources, including government positions, in plural societies. L1JPHART, supra note 1,at 38. The advantage of such a
system is that it provides a neutral standard and thus hopefully reduces divisiveness and resentment. Id. at 39. "[P]arity is an especially useful alternative to proportionality when a plural
society is divided into two segments of unequal size. In such a case, proportionality does not
eliminate a majority-minority confrontation in decision-making bodies because it merely reflects
segmental strengths." Id.
273. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126.
274. LUPHART, supra note 1, at 28.

275. Id. ("On the one hand, broad agreement among citizens seems more democratic than
simple majority rule, but, on the other hand, the only real alternative to majority rule is minority
rule - or at least minority veto.").
276. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126. This conflict is the conflict between group rights and
individual rights. See supra notes 33-46 and accompanying text. Without some ability to function politically as a group, the Slovaks feared that they would be unable to protect their unique
Slovak interests as they perceived them. Because the Czechs did not perceive their cultural identity as threatened, and because they constituted a majority, it was not as important to them to
have the veto. Thus the different forms of democracy proposed represent the different needs of
different groups.
277. LEFF, supra note 245, at 126-27.
278. Id. at 127.
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The federation which .emerged in October 1968-the only part of
the program of the Prague Spring to survive the August invasionrepresented an uneasy compromise between these rival conceptions of
democracy. 279 The compromise established is largely still in place today. The supreme legislative body is the Federal Assembly, 28 0 which
is divided into two houses: the Chamber of the People and the Chamber of Nations. 281 The Chamber of Nations is composed of 150 deputies, seventy-five elected from the Czech Republic and seventy-five
from the Slovak Republic. 282 Deputies to the Chamber of the People
are elected by direct vote throughout the country. 283 Resolutions are
adopted by the Federal Assembly by a simple majority of each Chamber, except for certain acts for which majority rule is prohibited. 284 In
such cases, the members of the Chamber of Nations elected from the
Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic vote separately and a majority, or in some cases a supermajority, of each, voting separately, is
25
required.
The 1968 Federation Act also provided for parity in office holding.
This was to ensure that top level posts in the federal government were
equally distributed between Czechs and Slovaks. If, for example, the
Chairman of the Federal Assembly is a Czech, the Vice-Chairman
would have to be a Slovak and vice versa. 28 6 Similarly the composition of the Constitutional Court was constitutionally mandated to be
half Czech and half Slovak, 287 and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman
could not be citizens of the same republic. 288 The Federation Act also
addressed Slovak concerns regarding the asymmetry of the situation
prior to 1969 by creating parallel Czech organs.
In addition to the structural decentralization, there were also dis279. Id. (arguing that this compromise is theoretically inconsistent).
280. Federation Act, art. 29(1), translatedin CONSTITUTIONS OF THE WORLD, supra note
158.
281. Id. art. 29(2).
282. Id. art. 31(2).
283. Id. art. 30(1).
284. Id. art. 40(3). Articles 41 to 43 establish which acts require a super majority. These
include, inter alia, constitutional acts and amendments.
285. Id. art. 41 (three-fifths majority of each required); art. 42(1) (simple majority of each
required).
286. Id. art. 56.
287. Id. art. 94(4).
288. Id. art. 95(2); see also DEAN, supra note 210, at 23-24. According to Dean, there was a
consensus among Slovak economists in the period leading up to the Prague Spring on the problem of slow economic growth in Slovakia: (1) The centralized planning process and the inability
of Slovak authorities to implement planning policy impeded Slovak economic growth; and (2)
The creation and implementation of long-range development policy for Slovakia should be carried out by Slovak authorities in order to make more effective use of Slovak resources. Id.
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putes about the degree to which policymaking should be decentralized.
The Slovaks wanted to limit the sphere of federal competence to general planning and international relations, while the Czechs sought fed2 89
eral coordination of policy and a broader sphere of common affairs.
Of particular importance for future events was the problem that decentralized planning would pose for central economic organization 29 0
and the implications of the federation for the reorganization of the
29
government and Communist Party. '
It was in part these concerns which led to the .1968 invasion, and in
1970 to a revision of the Federation Act and the recentralization of
economic affairs. 292 The original federal arrangement was modified in
the direction of greater federal and central control. 29 3 In December of
1970, the Constitution was revised to provide for the reunification of
the economy, some Slovak ministries were abolished or reorganized,
and their jurisdictions partially transferred to the federal
294
government.
For several reasons, even the initial federal solution was unsatisfactory to the Slovaks. The parity principle was most consistently implemented in the Constitutional Court and the National Assembly, which
have been the weakest political institutions in traditional communist
systems. 295 The federal ministries, where decisionmaking and policy
implementation took place, were still governed by the majority principle. 296 The authority of the legislative and judicial institutions in
which the parity principle was realized could only be sustained
through a democratized system. Thus the institutional concessions
made to Slovaks were extremely vulnerable to the postinvasion process
of "normalization, ' ' 297 which left the federation in place but reversed
all of the democratic advances of the Prague Spring. The federal system, even after 1970, gave Slovaks greater regional autonomy than
before, but still fell short of providing institutional guarantees of
29 8
Slovak access to and influence on politics.
289. LEFF, supra note 245, at 127-28.
290. Id.
291. DEAN, supra note 210, at 41.
292. Id. at 4.
293. LEFF, supra note 245, at 247.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 245.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id. at 249. This concern may in large part be addressed in the current constitutional
reform. Since Article 6 of the 1960 Constitution, providing for the leading role of the Communist Party, has been repealed, parity in legislative and judicial institutions is largely maintained
(as has been the case in current reforms, see infra notes 355-359 and accompanying text), and
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Prior to the invasion a federalization of the Communist Party had
been contemplated as part of the rejection of the asymmetrical structural model, but these plans were abandoned after the invasion, 299 and
indeed the planned federation of the party was a significant factor in
the Soviet decision to invade. 30 0 Thus the central organs continued to
double as Czech organs-there was a separate Slovak party-which
perpetuated the asymmetry in political life, given the leading role of
30
the Communist Party.
The Slovaks have, however, made progress within the federation.
Since 1969, Slovakia has achieved a roughly proportional share of the
country's production. 30 2 Slovakia also benefited more from postinvasion investment policies than Bohemia and Moravia. 30 3 Slovakia's increased standard of living has contributed to a sense of resentment on
the part of Czechs. 3°4 Between 1969 and 1983 Slovaks received
roughly one-third of the ministerial assignments, although Czechs
maintained a monopoly in top government positions in security and
control functions. 30 5 Unfortunately for future relations between
Czechs and Slovaks, the influx of Slovaks into the federal bureaucracy
was often at the expense of Czech reformers who were purged from
30 6
their positions as part of the postinvasion "normalization" process.
Another legacy of the events of 1968 is resentment on the part of
Czech reformists, who felt that the Slovaks abused the reformist alliance of 1968 by pushing forward federation over democracy, and what
was perceived as Slovak complicity in the "normalization" of the
Husak regime. 30 7 And indeed, there was little cooperation between
Czech and Slovak reformists after 1968.308 The level of Slovak activism in dissident activities was much smaller than that of Czechs. Only
four to five percent of government retaliations against dissidents in the
late 1970s took place in Slovakia and ninety percent of the political
these institutions will most likely become far more important in the political life of the country.
Hopefully the legislature, not the bureaucracy, will become the primary policy-making body,
thus assuring Slovak access to genuine legal and policy making organizations.
299. LEFF, supra note 245, at 245-46.
300. DEAN, supra note 210, at 4.
301. LEFF, supra note 245, at 245-46.
302. Id. (citation omitted).
303. COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 231, at 131.

304. Id. ("this split has developed into the most serious nationality conflict in the history of
the country").
305. LEFF, supra note 245, at 253.
306. Id. at 270; COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE, supra note 231, at 131.
307. LEFF, supra note 245, at 262, 270; DEAN, supra note 210, at 25.
308. LEFF, supra note 245, at 262, 267; see also id. at 268-72 for a discussion of the growth of
Czech resentment of the Slovaks since the creation of the Federation.
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trials following the invasion involved Czechs. 3°9
E.

The "Velvet Revolution" and Beyond: The Czech and Slovak
FederalRepublic

The CSFR was one of the last countries in the former Soviet Bloc
to have its revolution in 1989, but its revolution was also one of the
fastest.3 10 It began on November 17, when a rally commemorating the
death of a student killed by the Nazis in 1939 turned into a protest for
democracy; the police responded with violence. In response to the police brutality a number of antigovernment protests took place in the
days following November 17. On November 19, the opposition group
Civic Forum was formed in Prague and the next day a similar group,
the Public Against Violence, was established in Bratislava. On November 26, the Communist-led government met with members of
Civic Forum. Both Civic Forum and Public Against Violence called
for a general strike on November 27, if their demands for freedom of
speech and political pluralism were not met. The strike took place as
scheduled, and negotiations continued with the government. As
agreed to in the negotiations, a number of deputies resigned from the
Federal Assembly on December 28, and opposition members took
their places. On December 29, the Federal Assembly elected Vaclav
Havel President of the Republic. In June of 1990 new elections to the
Federal Assembly were held and the Public Against Violence and
Civic Forum won 46.6% of the vote. 31' Once a new Federal Assembly
had been elected, negotiations on the new constitution began in
earnest.
Nationality problems, long if not always successfully repressed
under the postwar communist regimes in Eastern Europe, resurfaced
once the old regime fell.3 1 2 In the CSFR the problem was somewhat
309. Id. at 264.
310. Material in this paragraph is adapted from AFTER THE VELVET REVOLUTION, supra
note 188, at 14-20 and Chronology 1989, 69 FOREIGN AFF. 213, 226-30 (1990).
311. Czechoslovak Election: Now, Govern, THE ECONOMIST, June 16, 1990, at 53, 54. The
Slovak National Party won 11% of the vote in Slovakia, giving them six seats in the House of the
People. Id. at 54. The Hungarian minority in Slovakia formed a coalition with the German
speakers in Slovakia, gaining 8.6% of the vote in Slovakia (2.8% nationally) giving them four
seats. The Moravians won 7.9% of the vote in the Czech Republic (5.4% nationally) giving
them nine seats. Id.
312. In addition to the problems in the CSFR, one has only to think of events in Yugoslavia
in the summer of 1991, or the quickly disintegrating Soviet Union. See, e.g., Edward L. Keenan,
Rethinking the U.S.S.R., Now That Its Over, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1991, § 4, at 3; Serge Schmemann, Soviet Congress Yields Rule to Republics to Avoid Political and Economic Collapse, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 6, 1991, at Al; Serge Schmemann, Soviets Recognize Baltic Independence, Ending
51-Year Occupation of3 Nations, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1991, at Al; Yugoslavia's Ethnic Fighting
Begins to Look Like War, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, § 4, at 3.
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unexpected and emerged in early 1990 when President Havel introduced a bill in the Federal Assembly to change the name of the country from the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the Czechoslovak
Republic. It was then that the "battle of the hyphen" reemerged; the
31 3
eventual compromise was the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic.
Since then, the political and constitutional debates have taken place
largely in the context of the relations between Czechs and Slovaks. 31 4
Before a new constitution is adopted for the CSFR, the leaders of the
country decided that certain provisions should be adopted as amendments to the current constitution. 31 5 Since the 1989 revolution, several constitutional acts have been adopted defining the jurisdiction
between the federal government and the republics, 3 1 6 creating a Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms, 31 7 and establishing a Constitutional Court.31 8 The structure of the Federal Assembly, however,
3 19
remains that which was established by the 1968 Federation Act.
As was discussed earlier, the 1968 Federation Act was enacted
largely in response to Slovak demands for greater recognition and autonomy. 320 The party, however, was not federalized, and since before
the 1989 revolution real policymaking and decisionmaking remained
within the party, the legislative framework of the federation was never
really tested. Now that the Federal Assembly has become a genuine
legislative body some of the difficulties of the system have become apparent. As the approval of both houses is required for enactment, in
cases requiring a three-fifths majority, thirty-one deputies from either
of the republics in the Chamber of Nations, voting as a block, can
prevent enactment. 321 This procedure gives a great deal of power to
313. Slovakia, The Spirit Revives, ECONOMIST, June 9, 1990, at 53; Jan Carnogursky, Physics,
Psychology and the Gentle Revolution, in AFTER THE VELVET REVOLUTION, supra note 188, at

111-12. The name was officially adopted by the Federal Assembly in Constitutional Act No. 101
of April 20, 1990 (on file with The Michigan Journal of International Law).
314. An excellent and detailed discussion of current constitutional reform in the Czech and
Slovak Federal Republic is Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146. Both authors were part of team
of American and West Europeans who participated in conferences with the Czechs and Slovaks
responsible for drafting the new constitution.
315. Id. at 521-22.
316. Federal Assembly Resolution No. 75, Dec. 12, 1990 [hereinafter Competencies Act] (on
file with Michigan Journal of International Law).
317. Constitutional Act of Jan. 9, 1991, instituting the Charter of Fundamental Rights and
Freedoms [hereinafter Charter] (on file with the Michigan Journal of International Law).
318. Constitutional Act of Feb. 27, 1991, concerning the Constitutional Court of the Czech
and Slovak Federal Republic [hereinafter Constitutional Act of Feb. 27, 1991] (on file with the
Michigan Journal of International Law).
319. See supra notes 280-88 and accompanying text.
320. See supra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
321. For a more detailed discussion of the problems and ramifications of this scheme of
voting, see Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 548-49.
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deputies from either republic in the Chamber of Nations, if they vote
together, to block legislation which is supported by a numerical majority of the deputies and creates a likelihood of deadlocks. As discussed
above, the CSFR is not the only country to use a minority veto mechanism. 322 A frequent solution to the conflict between principles of majority rule and minority veto is to provide for majority rule in normal
decisions and "extraordinary majorities" in more important decisions,
324
such as constitutional amendments; 323 this is the case in the CSFR.
The balance, however, is a delicate one. While the constant presence
of deadlocks and resentment of minority veto may heighten tension
and lead to disunity, strict majority rule in a society with potentially
hostile groups may also, in the words of Professor Lijphart, "strain the
unity and peace of the system. ' 325 In political theory the hope is that
the presence of the minority veto will give the minority a sufficient
sense of political security to allow for cooperation among groups and
prevent overuse of the veto. 326 This is problematic in the CSFR because the bifurcated nature of the federation gives most conflicts a
confrontational quality, like that of government and opposition. This
type of competitive confrontation can be "destructive of any prospect
of building a nation in which different peoples might live together in
harmony.

' 327

President Havel has presented an alternative mode 3 28 for dealing
with the problem of creating a workable federal legislature which is
capable of acting quickly, but which also provides some balance to the
principle of simple majority rule and addresses Slovak concerns about
being a permanent minority. This draft proposes a Federal Assembly,
which would be elected directly throughout the CSFR, 329 and a Federal Council which would consist of the Chairperson and fourteen
members each from the Presidium of the Czech National Council and
the Slovak National Council. 330 The Federal Council could veto
measures of the Federal Assembly by a two-thirds vote, whereupon
they would be returned to the Federal Assembly for another vote. 33 1
322. See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
323. LuPHART, supra note 1, at 28.
324. See supra notes 280-85 and accompanying text.
325. LIJPHART, supra note 1, at 28.
326. Id. at 36-37.
327. Id. at 145.
328. The proposal of President Havel was presented in the form of a draft constitution in
March 1991 [hereinafter Havel Draft] (on file with the Michigan Journalof InternationalLaw).
329. Id. art. 77.
330. Id. art. 99.
331. Id. art. 92(1).
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If the Federal Assembly were to repass a bill by a three-fifths majority
of the Czech and Slovak members of the Federal Assembly, voting
separately, then the bill would be enacted.3 32 The adoption of Constitutional Acts and a declaration of war would still necessitate a threefifths majority of the deputies of each republic. 333 Parity in officeholding would also be maintained between the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Federal Assembly. 334 This arrangement
has the advantage of creating a balance between the need for a flexible
and responsive legislative process and the Slovak fear of being relegated to the position of permanent opposition. As Lloyd Cutler and
Herman Schwartz have pointed out, it also more closely integrates the
governments of the republics into the federal government, giving them
a greater sense of responsibility in the acts of the federal government. 335 It provides a forum for Czech and Slovak cooperation as well

as a "veto mechanism," while also reducing the potential for overuse
of the veto.
An example of the type of deadlock that can be created in the bipartite, power-sharing government structure in the CSFR is the controversy surrounding the constitutional amendment establishing the
jurisdictional divisions between the federal government and the governments of the republics. 3 36 A large part of the debate centered on

the issue of whether the power to declare and protect the human rights
of minorities (especially Hungarians and Gypsies) would be under the
jurisdiction of the National Councils or the Federal Assembly. 337 This
controversy was sparked in part by the adoption of the Slovak Language Law. The bill adopted provided for Slovak to be the official
language in Slovakia and that minorities making up ten, or possibly
twenty percent of the population in a community would have the right
to use their languages in official contacts; an alternative bill proposed
by the Matica Slovenska, the Slovak cultural institute, had provided
for "Slovak without exception. ' 338 The eventual compromise on the
federal bill was to expand the federal government's power over minority protection. 339 This type of controversy demonstrates the need for
332. Id. art. 92(2); see also Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 549.

333. Havel Draft, supra note 328, art. 89(3).
334. Id. art. 98(3).
335. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 550.
336. Competencies Act, supra note 316.
337. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 524-25.

338. Adoption of Slovak Language Bill Causes Protests and Threat of Strike, British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Oct 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, INTL File.

339. Id.; Competencies Act, supra note 280, T 37 (amending art. 37(3) of the 1968 Federation
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balance between local and federal control. If there was no federal
check on Slovakia, it is possible that the "self-determination" of
Slovakia might lead to a lack of "self-determination" for other ethnic
and linguistic groups living in the territory of Slovakia.
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and Freedom (the Charter), 34 0 adopted January 9, 1991, incorporates the principles of the European Convention on Human Rights. 341 It includes the principle of
nondiscrimination,' providing that "[flundamental human rights and
freedoms are guaranteed to everybody irrespective of sex, race, colour
of skin, language, faith, religion, political or other conviction, ethnic
or social origin, membership in a national or ethnic minority, property, birth, or other Status. '342 Consistent with the Copenhagen Conference document, 343 it also provides for self-selection in determining
nationality. 3' Chapter III of the Charter concerning the rights of national and ethnic minorities is brief, containing only two Articles. Article 24 provides for nondiscrimination, providing that "[t]he national
or ethnic identity of any individual shall not be used to his or her
detriment. ' 34 5 The Charter also guarantees to citizens who constitute
a minority the right to develop their own culture, to disseminate and
receive information in their native language, and the right of association.3 46 Minorities are further guaranteed the right to education in
' ' 348
their own language, 347 "to use their language in official contact[,]
and "to participate in the settlement of matters concerning the national and ethnic minorities. ' 349 The right to education is guaranteed
and school attendance for a period to be specified by later law is made
350
obligatory.
Another major constitutional amendment which has been adopted
is the act establishing the Constitutional Court of the CSFR. 35 1 One
Act) ("If required by the unity of the legal system, the Federal Assembly shall effect the codification in matters concerning nationalities and ethnic minorities .... ").
340. The Charter was adopted as a constitutional act by the Federal Assembly with the
requisite supermajorities.
341. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 531.
342. Charter, supra note 317, art. 3(1).
343. Copenhagen Conference, supra note 130, 32.
344. Charter, supra note 317, art. 3(2) ("Everybody has the right to a free choice of his or her
nationality.").
345. Id. art. 24.
346. Id. art. 25(1).
347. Id. art. 24(2)(a).
348. Id. art. 25(2)(b).

349. Id. art. 25(2)(c).
350. Id. art. 33(1).
351. Constitutional Act of Feb. 27, 1991, supra note 318.
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important function of the Constitutional Court is to resolve jurisdictional disputes between the republics and the federal government. It
will rule on conflicts of jurisdiction between the organs of the federal
government, between the organs of the federal government and the
republics, and between the organs of the two republics. 352 The Court
will also have the power to rule on the constitutionality of acts of the
Federal Assembly, the constitutionality of government decrees, and to
determine whether acts of the Federal Assembly, the Czech National
Council and the Slovak National Council conform with the international human rights treaties to which the CSFR is a party. 35 3 For the
Slovaks, the importance of a constitutional court was to provide a
legal and institutional guarantee that constitutional provisions for
Slovak self-government would not be diluted, as had been the case
3
under the 1968 Federation Act.

54

Parity in office holding is also a principle that has continued to
apply in the CSFR. The act establishing the Constitutional Court includes provisions on parity. Six of the twelve justices shall be citizens
of the Slovak Republic and six shall be citizens of the Czech Republic. 355 The Chief Justice and Assistant Chief Justice may not be citi-

zens of the same Republic.3 56 The Court is to hear cases either in full
session or panels of four justices.3 57 The application of the parity principle may lead to split decisions, if panel votes split along national
lines. a 5 8 The Compentencies Act creates the State Bank of Czechoslo-

vakia and provides for parity in office holding between the two vice
governors of the Bank and the Central Bureau of the Bank; the position of Governor of the Bank will rotate between citizens of the Czech
and Slovak Republics.

35

9

CONCLUSION

While the future structure of the CSFR is not clear, and current
3
debate sometimes leads to doubts about its continued existence, 60 it

352. Id. art. 4.
353. Id. art. 2.
354. Slovak ParliamentPremierMeciar on Czechoslovak FederationLaw, British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, Nov. 23, 1990, available in LEXIS, NEXIS
Library, INTL File.
355. Constitutional Act of Feb. 27, 1991, supra note 318, art. 10(4).
356. Id. art. 11(2).
357. Id. art. 14.

358. Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 146, at 538.
359. Competencies Act, supra note 316, art. 5(12) (amending art. 14(2) of the Federation
Act, supra note 280).
360. Burton Bollag, Havel Asserts Nation Faces Breakup, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 11, 1990, at A4.
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appears at least for the time being that some form of federation will
remain in place. But the questions currently being raised about Slovak
autonomy are not new. They have persisted since an independent
state of Czechs and Slovaks was first contemplated. Any future constitution of the CSFR must ultimately grapple with these issues.
In her book on national conflict in Czechoslovakia, Carol Skalnik
Leff argues that the real purpose of federalism is to provide procedural
legitimacy to political decisionmaking and political harmony.3 6 1 She
further argues that the main reason for Czech acquiescence to federalism was the hope that it would end Slovak complaints, 362 yet Slovak
demands have persisted. Ultimately, if the CSFR is to remain a single
nation, the federation will have to provide a greater sense of legitimacy. While democracy is important to a sense of government legitimacy, the form of that democracy is equally important. As this Note
has shown, in a country composed of diverse populations, recognition
of the right of distinct groups to a certain measure of self-government
contributes to this sense of legitimacy. The solution, however, is more
complicated than simply allowing "peoples" to choose their own form
of self-government. How groups are defined is equally important.
Self-determination for Slovakia must not be at the expense of the right
to self-determination of other groups living in Slovakia. Some form of
the right of self-determination must be recognized if the rights of all
groups are to be respected and if the governments of plural societies
are ultimately to be acknowledged as legitimate by all their citizens.
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362. Id.

